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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE June 29, 1999, the States have been free to infringe patents
without incurring any liability under the federal patent laws. State
law still applies to such infringement, assuming the State has waived
its sovereign immunity or the patentee can claim an exemption to the
doctrine's applicability. This gap in the coverage of the patent laws is the
result of the Supreme Court's nullification of a federal law that held the
States to the same standard as private litigants in patent-infringement
suits. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. Col-
lege Savings Bank,1 a five-to-four decision authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress exceeded its power under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (the Pat-
ent Remedy Act or PRA).2
Invoking the congruence and proportionality analysis first described in
City of Boerne v. Flores,3 the Court scoured the legislative record for evi-
dence that the States were violating the Constitution by depriving paten-
tees of due process of law.4 Finding little evidence of unconstitutional
behavior by the States, the Court noted that Congress had not even con-
sidered whether adequate remedies were available at the state level
before subjecting the States to the jurisdiction of the federal courts at the
behest of an aggrieved patentee. Consequently, the Court determined
that the PRA was not responsive to or designed to prevent unconstitu-
tional behavior 5 and invalidated the purported abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in patent infringement suits.6
1. 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) [hereinafter Florida Prepaid].
2. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (1992), Pub. L. No.
102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h) & 296(a) (1994)).
3. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) [hereinafter City of Boerne].
4. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-47.
5. Id. at 646.
6. The Eleventh Amendment, despite its narrow textual scope, has been interpreted
to prohibit private suits against States, their political subdivisions and their instrumentali-
ties. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (finding private suits for damages against
States to be barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress possesses no power to abrogate Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity by virtue of acts predicated on Article I of the Constitution); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress cannot provide for private suits against
States in state courts when exercising its Article I powers); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976) (holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers on Congress a power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Carlos Manuel Vasquez, What is Eleventh Amend-
ment Immunity:, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997). A State asserts its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity when it moves to dismiss private actions for damages based on federal law in either
federal or state court. Eleventh Amendment immunity should be distinguished from any
sovereign immunity enjoyed by a State by virtue of its constitution or common law. Such
immunity would likely be invoked to prevent recovery by a private plaintiff in an action
predicated on state law. Unless the context otherwise requires, references to sovereign
immunity in this paper are intended to denote Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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Florida Prepaid has altered the landscape of federal patent law and,
arguably, all other federal protections of intellectual property (including
copyright and trademark). The decision provoked impassioned denuncia-
tions from Senate Democrats and Republicans alike, 7 as well as legal
commentators, 8 but little has been done to correct the situation. Con-
gress' delay in repairing the damage wreaked by a bare majority of Su-
preme Court Justices is due primarily to Florida Prepaid's apparent
requirement that Congress must compile a comprehensive legislative re-
cord detailing a pattern of patent infringement by the States, unaccompa-
nied by due process, before any steps can be taken to bring States within
the federal patent regime. Wary to "navigat[e] the minefield of condi-
tions laid down by the Supreme Court" for use of the Enforcement
Power,9 proponents of fairness and uniformity in the patent system have
focused on alternative, yet constitutionally uncertain, proposals. 10 As of
late 2001, no bill had emerged from committee.
It is my thesis that Florida Prepaid misapplied the congruence and pro-
portionality analysis described in City of Boerne. That mode of analysis
was adopted to help the Court distinguish legislation that enforces a Four-
teenth Amendment right from legislation that redefines a constitutional
right, for only the former type of legislation is authorized by § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Florida Prepaid, the Court paid no heed to
the purpose of congruence-and-proportionality analysis; instead, Chief
Justice Rehnquist treated it as a new test for appropriateness and found
the PRA to be an inappropriate response to an uncertain problem. This
misapplication of City of Boerne has stultified the congressional response.
However, a careful application of the congruence-and-proportionality
analysis within the spirit of City of Boerne and its progeny provides a
road map to effective enforcement legislation.
This paper discusses how Congress ought to respond to Florida Pre-
paid, examining three constitutional bases for abrogating state sovereign
7. See supra text accompanying notes 388-392.
8. See, e.g., John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five and the Second Coming of an Anti-
Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1098 (2000) ("the Gang of
Five cannot disguise the fact that they have nothing but disdain for the federal system that
our country adopted both in 1787 and following the Civil War"); David L. Shapiro, The
1999 Trilogy: What is Good Federalism?, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 755 (2000) (claiming that
Florida Prepaid took the Eleventh Amendment into "an area where there can be no rea-
sonable claim ... that state sovereignty stands in the way of federal regulation"); A. Chris-
topher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding To Congress: The Supreme Court's New
"On the Record" Constitutional Review Of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 369
(2001) (calling the approach of Florida Prepaid "fundamentally ill advised"); Daan
Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against States: Alden and Federalism Non-Sense,
49 AM. U. L. REV. 611 (2000); Cliston Brown, Patent and Trademark Office Seeks Leverage
against States, CORP. LEGAL TIMES 26 (Mar. 2001) (presenting concerns of the business
community).
9. State Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property,
106th Cong. (2000) (prepared testimony of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright for the
United States) [hereinafter Peters Testimony], 2000 WL 23831768.
10. See generally infra Part VI-B.
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immunity in patent-infringement cases: the prohibition against arbitrary
abuses of power (substantive due process), the guarantee of procedural
due process, and the States' obligation to make just compensation after
taking private property for public use. The paper begins with an analysis
of the Florida Prepaid decision. Part II-A recalls the context and purpose
behind the congruence-and-proportionality analysis announced in City of
Boerne. Part II-B describes the key elements of the legislation invali-
dated in Florida Prepaid. Part 11-C summarizes the Court's opinion.
And part II-D identifies sources of difficulty in the majority opinion, con-
cluding that the Court's preoccupation with the legislative record eclipsed
the more fundamental task of comparing the Patent Remedy Act with
constitutional standards.
The next three parts of the paper apply the congruence-and-propor-
tionality analysis to the PRA to test whether it can be understood to en-
force three constitutional rights. Part III explains why the PRA cannot
be understood to enforce the substantive aspects of the Due Process
Clause. Part IV examines the Court's approach to procedural due pro-
cess and concludes that it is possible to conceive of the PRA as prototypi-
cal § 5 legislation enforcing this aspect of due process. Though Florida
Prepaid refused to consider the possibility that the PRA enforced the Just
Compensation Clause, 1 Part V considers that very argument.
The next portion of this paper focuses on possible responses to Florida
Prepaid. One response would be to stay with the status quo, that is, leave
it to state courts to provide remedies for patent infringement by state
entities. Using the law of Texas as an example, Part VI-A discusses reme-
dies available under the common law and the Texas Constitution. An-
other response would involve new federal legislation to restore at least
some of the protections patentees enjoyed under the PRA. Part VI-B
outlines several alternatives, including Senator Patrick Leahy's proposed
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act (IPPRA), which would
condition the States' participation in the federal intellectual-property sys-
tem on a waiver of state sovereign immunity. In part VI-C the author
provides guidelines for drafting an amendment to the federal patent laws
to restore access to the federal courts for patentees seeking redress from
state infringers.
II. FLORIDA PREPAID AND THE
CITY OF BOERNE ANALYSIS
College Savings Bank (CSB) markets a patented college-financing
methodology called the CollegeSure CD. l2 This product is designed to
make sure investors have sufficient funds to finance a post-secondary ed-
ucation.13 In 1994, CSB brought suit under the Patent Remedy Act
against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Flor-
11. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641-42, n.7.
12. Id. at 630.
13. Id. at 631.
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ida Prepaid) for alleged patent infringement through its administration of
a tuition prepayment program.14 Florida Prepaid, an instrumentality of
the State of Florida, asserted its immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment and moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court denied the
motion,15 and the Federal Circuit affirmed, declaring that Congress' ob-
jective "to prevent states from depriving patent owners of their property
without due process through infringing acts ... comports with the text
and judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 16
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Congress did not properly
abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.17 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress invoked three
sources of authority when enacting the PRA: the power to regulate pat-
ents, the commerce power, and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment (the
enforcement power). 18 Since Congress lacks authority to override Elev-
enth Amendment immunity when exercising an Article I power,19 the
Patent Remedy Act's applicability to the States could not be based on the
Patent or Commerce clauses.20 However, this immunity must succumb to
legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.21 Thus, the validity of
the PRA's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity depended on
whether Congress properly exercised its enforcement power.22
Invoking the "congruence and proportionality" analysis announced in
City of Boerne v. Flores,23 the Chief Justice mined the legislative record
for evidence that States were "depriving patent owners of property with-
out due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court
patent actions."' 24 He uncovered little such evidence. Congress gave
scant consideration to the forms of process offered by the States, not to
mention whether those remedies actually satisfied due process. Conse-
quently, in the Court's judgment, the decision to "ma[k]e all States imme-
diately amenable to suit in federal court for all kinds of possible patent
infringement ... for an indefinite duration" constituted a disproportion-
ate response to an uncertain problem. 25 Since the Patent Remedy Act
was not valid § 5 legislation, Florida's Eleventh Amendment immunity
14. Id. CSB also sought relief under the Lanham Act for alleged "misstatements about
its own tuition savings plans in its brochures and annual reports." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 671 (1999).
15. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400
(D.N.J. 1996).
16. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
17. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 634.
18. Id. at 635 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ch. 8 (patent power); id. art. I, § 8, ch. 3
(commerce power); Id. amend. XIV, § 5 (enforcement power)).
19. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
20. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636.
21. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
22. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637.
23. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
24. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646.
25. Id. at 647.
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remained in force.26 CSB could not rely on federal law to remedy Florida
Prepaid's infringement of its patent.
Given Florida Prepaid's emphasis on the legislative record, one might
infer that Congress is powerless to protect the property rights of patent
holders against state infringement unless the States are persistently vio-
lating constitutional rights. This is precisely the inference drawn by
lawmakers, administrators, and professors seeking to shape corrective
legislation.2 7 Such an inference is unwarranted. As discussed below, City
of Boerne's congruence-and-proportionality analysis has nothing to do
with when Congress may act or whether such action is appropriate. The
congruence-and-proportionality analysis distinguishes legislation that en-
forces from legislation that redefines substantive constitutional guaran-
tees.28 The congruence phase of the City of Boerne analysis compares the
statutory standard for liability with the constitutional standard, while the
proportionality phase confirms that Congress has not abused its "wide
latitude" to regulate constitutional conduct as a means to prevent or rem-
edy unconstitutional conduct.2 9 Once City of Boerne is properly under-
stood, the shortcomings of Florida Prepaid become plain.
A. CITY OF BOERNE AND THE ENFORCEMENT POWER
1. The Scope of Congress' Enforcement Power
The Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause reads, "The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article."'30 The Supreme Court has long recognized that § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes "a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure [its] guarantees. '31
Equally venerable is the notion that § 5 legislation is "appropriate" if it
passes the test articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Ma-
ryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the consti-
tution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional. ' 32 The Court echoed this interpreta-
tion in its construction of § 5 in Ex parte Virginia:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the
objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce sub-
mission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons
to the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal pro-
tection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited,
26. Id. at 648.
27. See infra part VI-B.
28. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444-45 (2000).
29. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
31. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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is brought within the domain of congressional power.33
The Court expressly relied on the McCulloch test in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach34 and other more recent cases upholding Congress' exercise
of its enforcement powers.35 In short, § 5 legislation is appropriate if it is
plainly adapted to a legitimate end.
The "legitimate end" authorized by § 5 is simply to "enforce" the
amendment's provisions. Obviously, congress may enact laws aimed at
blatant violations, but its discretion also encompasses the power to regu-
late "conduct which is not itself unconstitutional" as a means to that legit-
imate end.36 As the Court recently observed:
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation
that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the Amendment in-
cludes the authority both to remedy and to deter violations of rights
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of
conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amend-
ment's text.37
For example, the Supreme Court in 1959 unanimously held that a State
could rationally conclude, without violating the Equal Protection Clause,
that "only those who are literate should exercise the franchise."' 38 Even
though a literacy requirement could be constitutionally enacted by a
State, the Court in 1966 upheld Congress' temporary ban of literacy tests
in specific regions of the country as a reasonable means of enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment. 39 In 1970, the Court unanimously upheld Con-
gress' extension of the temporary ban nationwide.40 Wrote Justice
Stewart:
Congress has now undertaken to extend the ban on literacy tests to
the whole Nation. I see no constitutional impediment to its doing so.
... [N]ationwide application may be reasonably thought appropriate
when Congress acts against an evil such as racial discrimination
which in varying degrees manifests itself in every part of the country.
A remedy for racial discrimination which applies in all the States
underlines an awareness that the problem is a national one and re-
flects a national commitment to its solution.41
Thus, Congress may enact legislation it deems appropriate to enforce
the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment (as well as the Fourteenth
33. 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880). See also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18 (quoting
same).
34. 383 U.S 301, 326 (1966).
35. E.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980).
36. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
37. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S 62, 81 (2000).
38. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1959).
39. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966).
40. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); id.
at 147 (opinion Douglas, J.); id. at 217 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 235-36 (opinion of
Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ.); and id. at 284 (opinion of Stewart, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
41. Id. at 283-84 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
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Amendment), even if the conduct regulated is amenable to constitutional
application. The enforcement power is "plenary within the terms of the
constitutional grant" 42 and as broad as the McCulloch test will allow.
2. Enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
Sweeping though Congress' § 5 power may be, it is nevertheless limited
to enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees. Congress
possesses no power to "decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's restrictions on the States."'43 The power to define the scope of a
constitutional right lies not with the legislature but with the judiciary.44
This tension between the power of enforcement and the power of defini-
tion-between the power of Congress and the power of the Supreme
Court-was at the heart of City of Boerne.
a. Smith, Congress and RFRA
City of Boerne involved a challenge to the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1994 (RFRA).45 RFRA was drafted in response to Employ-
ment Division v. Smith,46 a 1990 decision interpreting the scope of the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.47 Smith held that laws of gen-
eral applicability are not unconstitutional simply because they impose an
incidental burden on religious exercise. 48 Members of Congress disputed
this constitutional interpretation and enacted RFRA to "restore" the
compelling-interest test in suits alleging a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.49 Under RFRA, any governmental law, statute, or ordinance
that substantially burdens a person's free exercise must be justified by a
compelling state interest.5 0 In addition, any such law must constitute the
least restrictive means of accomplishing that objective. 51
The Archbishop of San Antonio sued the City of Boerne under RFRA
after being denied a building permit.52 The federal district court granted
the city's motion to dismiss, finding that RFRA exceeded Congress' pow-
ers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 53 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that Congress' § 5 powers were broad enough to support
42. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
43. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
44. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994).
46. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
47. Under Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1927), the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporates the First Amendment's ban on laws interfering with the free exercise of
religion. Using its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may pass laws
meant to prevent States from unconstitutionally burdening free exercise.
48. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
50. Id. § 2000bb-1.
51. Id.
52. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
53. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352,
1354 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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RFRA as a means of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause.54 The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that RFRA attempted to redefine the substance
of the constitutional guarantee it purported to enforce. While the En-
forcement Clause empowers Congress to "prohibit conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional and intrude[ ] into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States,"' its power is not unlimited: Congress
may enforce but not define a constitutional violation.55 Because "the line
between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy
to discern," 56 Justice Kennedy announced a new test to distinguish be-
tween legislation that enforces and legislation that defines constitutional
norms: "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in opera-
tion and effect." 57
b. The Voting Rights Act as Model Legislation
Since the Court had sustained various provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 as valid § 5 legislation, City of Boerne used that Act as a
benchmark for congruence and proportionality. 58 The Voting Rights Act
sought to end racial discrimination in voting, an objective obviously con-
sistent with the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that "[t]he right of citi-
zens ...to vote shall not be denied or abridged ...by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. ' 59 The Fif-
teenth Amendment "has always been treated as self-executing and has
repeatedly been construed ... to invalidate state voting qualifications or
procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice. ' 60 The
Voting Rights Act's conception of the Fifteenth Amendment was congru-
ent with the received understanding of the amendment's substantive
guarantees. 61
Congress chose to accomplish its objective (enforcement of the Fif-
teenth Amendment) by regulating practices (voting qualifications) that,
absent a discriminatory purpose, are capable of constitutional applica-
tion.62 To illustrate how these regulations were not "so out of proportion
54. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1356 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
55. Id. (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 520.
58. Id. at 530-35.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The enforcement clauses for the Reconstruction
Amendments are virtually identical and are interpreted coextensively.
60. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
61. Though Justice Kennedy did not explicitly say as much, the inference might rea-
sonably be drawn from his reliance on case law upholding the Voting Rights Act and his
characterization of the Act's provisions as preventive or remedial. See City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 525-27.
62. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959) (not-
ing that no discriminatory object had been alleged).
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to [their] remedial or preventive object" that they appear to "attempt a
substantive change in constitutional protections, ' 63 Justice Kennedy
noted that the Voting Rights Act was passed in response to actual invidi-
ous racial discrimination in voting.64 Citing cases upholding the Voting
Rights Act, he described some of the Act's limits. In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,65 the Court sustained provisions that were directed at spe-
cific types of laws in specific parts of the country and were set to termi-
nate upon request if certain criteria were met. Literacy test bans
sustained in Katzenbach v. Morgan66 and Oregon v. Mitchell67 were di-
rected at a particular voting qualification "with a long history as a 'notori-
ous means to deny and abridge voting rights on racial grounds.'"68 In
City of Rome v. United States,69 the Court upheld provisions with jurisdic-
tional limits and termination dates. Justice Kennedy remarked that con-
gressional action need not include "termination dates, geographic
restrictions or egregious predicates" to constitute valid enforcement legis-
lation; rather, such limits "tend to ensure" that the legislation does not
"attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections. '70
c. RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause
The Court began its analysis of RFRA by identifying the constitutional
standard under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court measured RFRA
against the free exercise standard of Smith,71 taking for granted that laws
of general applicability are not unconstitutional simply because a burden
on religion cannot be justified by a compelling governmental interest.72
Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws "enacted with the un-
constitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices. '73 For
RFRA to enforce rather than decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment, its conception of the constitutional wrong to be remedied or
prevented must be congruent with Smith and a proportional means to
that end.
RFRA prohibits "government" from substantially burdening a person's
free exercise. 74 A plaintiff need only demonstrate that a religious belief
is sincerely held and that a law significantly or meaningfully curtails free
exercise. 75 With this rather modest showing, a law is invalid unless the
63. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
64. Id. at 525-27, 530.
65. 383 U.S. 301, 315-18 (1966)
66. 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966).
67. 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970).
68. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (quoting South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 355 (Black, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
69. 446 U.S. 156, 161 (1980).
70. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33.
71. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting) (objecting to continued application of Smith
in Free Exercise cases).
72. Id. at 514.
73. Id. at 529.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
75. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
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State can "demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show
that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering its interest. '76
RFRA regulates burdens resulting from rules of general applicability,
which Smith deemed constitutional so long as the laws were not moti-
vated by religious bigotry.77 Since such laws need only be rational to be
valid, RFRA requires a significantly greater justification for constitu-
tional state legislation than would ordinarily be required.78
Congress may regulate constitutional state conduct (here, generally ap-
plicable laws not motivated by religious animus) as a means of preventing
or remedying unconstitutional state conduct (generally applicable laws
motivated by religious animus) and "strong measures" (such as the
RFRA rule) might sometimes be justified by the "evil presented" (a re-
cord of generally applicable laws motivated by religious animus). 79 In
light of the vast incongruity between the standards imposed by the Con-
stitution and those imposed by RFRA, the fact that Congress compiled
no record of "modern instances of generally applicable laws passed be-
cause of religious bigotry" tended to indicate a substantive rather than
preventive or remedial purpose behind the law.80 The indiscriminate
scope of RFRA-which applies "to all federal and state law, statutory or
otherwise, whether adopted before or after its enactment" and contains
"no termination date or termination mechanism"-further confirmed its
substantive purpose.81 Congress did not adopt a test plainly adapted to
discovering invidious legislative motives.82 Instead, Congress enacted the
compelling-interest test, "the most demanding test known to constitu-
tional law."' 83 All told, RFRA could not "be understood as responsive to,
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."8 4 Rather, Congress
tried to overrule a constitutional interpretation without amending the
Constitution. Consequently, RFRA did not enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment and, when applied to the States, was an invalid exercise of
the § 5 power.8 5
3. Kimel's Application of City of Boerne
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 86 the Court applied City of
76. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
77. Id. at 532-34.
78. It should be noted that this analysis appears nowhere in the court's opinion. As
other have noted, the court "barely paused" to measure RFRA against the Free Exercise
Clause; after all, congress had expressed its intent to overrule Smith in no uncertain terms.
See Post & Siegel, supra note 29, at 461.
79. Id. at 530.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 532.
82. Id. at 535.
83. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534.
84. Id. at 532.
85. RFRA still applies to the federal government. See, e.g., In re Saenz, No. 00-2166,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698 (10th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001) (finding regulations promulgated
under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act to violate RFRA).
86. 528 U.S. 62, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
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Boerne's congruence-and-proportionality analysis to the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) to determine whether the statute en-
forces the Equal Protection Clause or constitutes "an attempt to
substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with respect to age dis-
crimination." Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began by iden-
tifying the scope of the States' constitutional obligation. Under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications based on age are judged by the rational-
basis standard: a State may constitutionally act on the basis of age so long
as the action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.87 Thus,
Congress enforces the Equal Protection Clause by enacting appropriate
legislation aimed at preventing or remedying irrational age discrimination
by the States. As indicated by City of Boerne, Congress may outlaw ra-
tional age discrimination by the States as a means to that legitimate end.
A plaintiff may prevail on an ADEA claim by showing that an adverse
employment action was based on age.88 This showing is significantly
lighter than the burden imposed under the Equal Protection Clause,
which requires the plaintiff to persuade the court that an age classifica-
tion "is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes . . . that the [State's] actions were irrational. ' 89 The ADEA
plainly lowers the plaintiff's burden. Conversely, the ADEA significantly
narrowed a State's defense: unless a statutory exception applies, a defen-
dant must prove that age is a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ).90 To assert this defense, an employer may show that there is "a
substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all employees above an
age lack the qualifications required for the position." 91 Alternatively, the
employer can demonstrate that an age-based proxy is necessary because
"it is highly impractical for the employer to insure by individual testing
that its employees will have the necessary qualifications for the job. '92
Since the BFOQ defense requires a much more persuasive justification
than the rationality test required by the Constitution, the ADEA "effec-
tively elevate[s] the standard for analyzing age discrimination. '93 The
fact that Congress compiled no record of irrational age-based behavior by
the States tended to show that the extension of the ADEA to the States
was more likely an attempt to reshape equal protection than an appropri-
ate means of enforcing it.94 Since the ADEA fails the City of Boerne test,
it does not enforce the Equal Protection Clause, and States need not liti-
gate ADEA claims for damages.
This past Term, the Court applied the congruence-and-proportionality
analysis to a portion of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).95
87. Id. at 646.
88. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
89. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
90. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 87-88 (2000).
91. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985).
92. Id. at 422-23.
93. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
94. Id. at 87-91.
95. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
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The majority opinion tracked the Kimel analysis fairly closely, concluding
that the standards for liability under the ADA exposed the States to far
greater liability than would be imposed under the Equal Protection
Clause. 96 Finding an inadequate record of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion against the disabled, the Court invalidated the ADA's damages pro-
vision as applied to the States. 97 Though a strong argument can be made
that Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis paid insufficient attention to a
leading case on the breadth of the Equal Protection Clause's protection
of persons with disabilities, 98 his application of City of Boerne is consis-
tent with Justice O'Connor's in Kimel.
4. Summary of the Congruence and Proportionality Analysis
City of Boerne's congruence-and-proportionality analysis helps identify
legislation that redefines constitutional norms. Although the commenta-
tors have failed to reach a consensus about the meaning of this test,99 a
96. Id. at 372-73.
97. Id. at 374 & n.9. Note that the Eleventh Amendment's immunity principle bars
suits against States for money damages or injunctive relief. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996) (affirming dismissal of suit seeking injunctive relief against a
State). Under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, this immunity can be abrogated by legislation enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment. See 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Certain other regulatory as-
pects of the ADA are not affected by the Eleventh Amendment and may be sustained as
valid regulation of the States under the commerce power.
98. Id. at 383-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. For example, Professor Colker infers from City of Boerne and its progeny that "the
Court will defer to Congress' conclusion that legislation is enacted to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment only if Congress creates an adequate legislative record." See Ruth
Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 667 (2000). Professor Kuer-
schner anticipates greater judicial scrutiny of the legislative record to ensure there in con-
gruence between the means employed and the ends to be achieved." As for
proportionality, the "constitutional violation must be roughly the 'same size as' the impact
the congressional action will have on the states." See Caroline E. Kuerschner, Our Vulner-
able Constitutional Rights: The Supreme Court's Restriction of Congress' Enforcement Pow-
ers in City of Boerne v. Flores, 78 OR. L. REV. 551, 555-56 (1999). Thomas W. Beimers
also reads City of Boerne to require congruence between the alleged misconduct of the
States, evidenced by congressional factfinding, and the proposed remedy. His reading of
the proportionality prong differs from Professor Kuerschner's: If the factfinding is "satis-
factory," the legislation should be upheld "so long as it is proportional to the problem to be
redressed." See Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision of City of Boerne
v. Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional Architecture, 26 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 789, 813 (1999). Like Professor Kuerschner and Mr. Beimers, Profes-
sors Post and Siegel interpret City of Beorne to comprise two phases of analysis. First,
courts reviewing the constitutionality of purported enforcement legislation should measure
the congruence and proportionality of the legislation against constitutional standards. Sec-
ond, courts should probe the legislative record to determine "whether Congress believed
that the regulations ... were necessary to combat 'unconstitutional discrimination."' See
Post & Siegel, supra note 29, at 460. Professors Hamilton and Schoenbrod emphasize the
proportionality prong, although they structure the analysis to comprise an inquiry similar
to mine. First, the remedy must "enforce the law violated, not create new law." Second,
"remedies must be in proportion to threatened or existing violations." See Marci A. Ham-
ilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 479 (1999). See also Daniel J.
Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1347-48 (2001) (distinguishing the task of defining the scope of consti-
tutional protections from that of examining the record for constitutional violations). There
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close reading of City of Boerne and its progeny suggests that the analysis
comprises two separate yet related phases, one focusing on the constitu-
tional standard and the other weighing the congressional response.
Under the congruence phase of the analysis, courts must determine
whether the challenged legislation embodies constitutional norms that
are consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of those guaran-
tees. 100 This phase of the City of Boerne analysis involves three discrete
questions. First, What is the standard by which a constitutional violation
is measured? Second, Is there a significant likelihood that the regulated
conduct is unconstitutional? Third, Does the statutory framework exhibit
a congruence with the obligations imposed by the Constitution?
The second phase of the City of Boerne analysis takes for granted that
Congress possesses substantial discretion to regulate constitutional acts in
order to prevent or remedy unconstitutional acts. 10 1 Pervasive regulation
of constitutional conduct carries the risk that Congress is redefining the
norm. Because of this risk, proportionality analysis seeks to ensure that
"strong measures" are responsive to or designed to prevent constitutional
violations.1 02 Relevant factors in this inquiry include a record of actual
violations by the States and inherent statutory limitations that reflect an
appreciation for any differences between the statutory and constitutional
standards of liability.10 3 Where Congress' means are proportional to a
legitimate end, the legislation enforces the Fourteenth Amendment and,
if appropriate under McCulloch, can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the States.
B. THE PATENT REMEDY AcT
Congress enacted the Patent Remedy Act in 1990 to make clear that
States are expected to comply with the patent laws. 10 4 The legislation
was prompted by the Federal Circuit's decision in Chew v. California,10 5
which applied the clear statement rule adopted by Atascadero State Hos-
pital v. Scanlon.10 6 Finding no statement of intent to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment immunity of the States in patent infringement suits, the
Chew court refused to entertain a suit against a state actor. To comply
with Atascadero, Congress added the following language to the patent
laws:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or em-
ployee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official
capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the
seems to be no agreement about what must be congruent, what must be proportional, or
where factfinding comes into play
100. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 513-16; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
83-86 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-67 (2001).
101. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-70.
102. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-33.
103. See id. at 533.
104. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632.
105. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
106. 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985).
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Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including
any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a
patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this
title. 10 7
Section 271 of the Patent Act details the types of infringement that are
considered unlawful. Chief among these is the prohibition of unautho-
rized uses, offers to sell, or sales of any patented invention. 10 8 Contribu-
tory infringement is also prohibited. 10 9  Furthermore, the PRA
prescribed that "remedies ... are available for [a State's] violation to the
same extent as such remedies are available in a suit against a private en-
tity." 110 Under the PRA, States ran the risk of incurring an obligation to
pay damages, interest, costs, treble damages, and attorneys' fees for pat-
ent infringement."' The PRA allowed remedies "in equity," which sug-
gests that an aggrieved patentee could secure injunctive relief against a
State. 112 Infringement of a design patent exposed the States to liability
for profits as well.113
C. THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF CITY OF BOERNE
IN FLORIDA PREPAID
Florida Prepaid held that Congress overstepped its authority when it
sought to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States in the Patent
Remedy Act. 1 4 In the Court's opinion, the PRA could not be viewed as
enforcing the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Consequently, it was an improper use of the only power by which Con-
gress can abrogate the States' immunity and CSB's suit against Florida
Prepaid should have been dismissed.
To reach this conclusion, the Court asked whether the PRA was "'ap-
propriate legislation' under § 5 as that term was construed in City of
Boerne.,"115 The Court interpreted City of Boerne to require Congress to
"identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, and.., tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or prevent-
ing such conduct" for Congress to invoke its § 5 powers."16 According to
the Chief Justice, this inquiry should be "guided by the principle that the
propriety of any § 5 legislation 'must be judged with reference to the his-
torical experience ... it reflects."' 117
107. Pub. L. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4230 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994)).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
109. Id. § 271(b).
110. Id. § 296(b).
111. Id.
112. Id. See also id. § 283.
113. Id. § 289.
114. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
115. Id. at 637.
116. Id. at 639.
117. Id. 639-40 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525).
[Vol. 55
REDRESSING STATE PATENT INFRINGEMENT
The Court described the "evil" at issue in Florida Prepaid as "state
infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent
owners compensation," suggesting that "unremedied patent infringe-
ments by the States .. .must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment
violation that Congress sought to redress in the PRA." 118 Congress, how-
ever, "identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone
a pattern of constitutional violations" before subjecting them to the pat-
ent laws. 119 Citing congressional testimony that States are "'willing and
able to respect patent rights,"' the Court found the prospect of infringe-
ment speculative.120
CSB argued that a State deprives patentees of property without due
process of law and takes private property without just compensation
when it infringes a patent.121 The Court acknowledged that Congress
can, under § 5, "legislate against [the] deprivation" of a patent by States,
but found "little support... that Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth
Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy Act. 1 22 Since the
Due Process Clause is violated "only where the State provides no rem-
edy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its in-
fringement of their patent,"1123 the Court looked to the record to see
whether Congress "considered the availability of state remedies for pat-
ent infringement. ' 124 Congressional testimony focused primarily on the
inconvenience of state remedies or the importance of uniformity in pat-
ent law.125 Though important considerations in other contexts, inconve-
nience and uniformity contribute nothing to the inquiry into "whether a
state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without
due process of law."1 26
The Court next cited Daniels v. Williams127 for the proposition that "a
state actor's negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person's
property does not 'deprive' that person of property within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause. 128 Noting that most patent infringements are
"innocent or at worst negligent," the Court implied that the run-of-the-
mill patent infringement is not a cognizable deprivation under the Due
Process Clause.129 Congress identified no "history of 'widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights,"' and only "a handful of
118. Id. at 640.
119. Id.
120. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (quoting Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hear-
ing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1990) (statement of
William S. Thompson)).
121. Id. at 641-42.
122. Id. at 642.
123. Id. at 643.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 644-46.
126. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
127. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
128. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
129. Id. See also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
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instances of state patent infringements that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution. ' 130 As such, the record provided only "scant support" for
the idea that "the States were depriving patent owners of property with-
out due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court
patent actions. 1 31
Thus, the Court concluded that the PRA is so out of proportion to any
remedial or preventive object that it cannot be seen as responsive to or
designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior. 132 Congress did not limit
the scope of the legislation to non-negligent infringement, to infringe-
ments authorized by state policy, to States with questionable remedies, or
to States with high incidences of infringement. 133 Because "Congress
made all States immediately amenable to suit in federal court for all kinds
of possible patent infringement and for an indefinite duration," it ex-
ceeded its § 5 authority and the PRA could not be sustained. 34
D. FLORIDA PREPAID is No CITY OF BOERNE
The analysis pursued in Florida Prepaid looks nothing like the analysis
described in City of Boerne.135 The Court misconceives the function of
the congruence-and-proportionality analysis in three fundamental ways
that lead to a confusing opinion that provides little guidance to those who
would amend the patent laws to hold the States liable for patent
infringement.
1. Florida Prepaid Erroneously Construes City of Boerne to Interpret
the Term "Appropriate"
First, the Chief Justice erroneously interpreted City of Boerne to in-
volve a construction of the term "appropriate." To be valid, he wrote, the
PRA "must... be 'appropriate' under § 5 as that term was construed in
City of Boerne.1 36 City of Boerne did not construe the term "appropri-
ate." As Justice Scalia notes in a companion case, City of Boerne "made
clear.., that the term 'enforce' [in § 5] is to be taken seriously-that the
object of valid § 5 legislation must be the carefully delimited remediation
or prevention of constitutional violations. ' 137
City of Boerne did not reach the question of appropriateness because
RFRA did not enforce the Free Exercise Clause. The same can be said of
130. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-46 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
131. Id. at 646.
132. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
133. Id. at 647.
134. Id.
135. Granted, the City of Boerne Court spent a great deal of time examining the record
before Congress and the lack of limitations in the law. This fact should not be taken to
suggest a greater importance for proportionality analysis. It simply reflects the fact that
one need not spend much time on the question of congruence when an act declares its
intent to change substantive constitutional law. Such is not the case with the PRA.
136. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647.
137. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672
(1999).
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Kimel and Garrett-there is no reason to discuss the appropriateness of
the private action authorized by the ADEA or the ADA if purported
enforcement legislation doesn't enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Jus-
tice Kennedy scrupulously avoided any discussion of the term "appropri-
ate" in City of Boerne, beyond mere citation of the broad formulations
found in McCulloch and Ex parte Virginia. Arguably, City of Boerne
adopted the congruence-and-proportionality test because the appropri-
ateness test contains little limiting effect. As far as City of Boerne indi-
cates, however, the test for appropriateness remains McCulloch.
The Chief Justice's implication in Florida Prepaid that City of Boerne's
congruence-and-proportionality analysis replaces McCulloch might be at-
tributed to a late-term slip of the pen.138 But the way Chief Justice Rehn-
quist applied congruence-and-proportionality analysis in Florida Prepaid
suggests that the Court was less interested in determining whether the
PRA redefines due process than it was in assessing whether the record
compiled by Congress justified the decision to strip the States of their
immunity. While the former inquiry makes sure legislation enforces, the
latter questions the appropriateness of Congress' course of action. The
Court's conflation of the enforcement analysis with the question of ap-
propriateness leads to two other shortcomings of the Florida Prepaid
opinion: an almost exclusive reliance on the record before Congress and a
complete muddling of the law of due process.
2. Florida Prepaid Pays Too Much Attention to the Legislative Record
A second shortcoming of Florida Prepaid is its almost exclusive reli-
ance on the record before Congress in determining whether the PRA
should be sustained under City of Boerne. In striking the PRA, the Court
fixated on the dearth of constitutional violations by the States through
patent infringement. Rather than ask whether the means were congruent
with the end-whether the liability imposed on the States for patent in-
fringement was congruent with the obligations of the Due Process
Clause-Florida Prepaid compiles evidence of the PRA's alleged dispro-
portionality. In an eighteen-page opinion, the Court cites the legislative
record no fewer than twenty-five times, concluding that Congress' deci-
sion to subject the States to suits for damages constituted a dispropor-
tional response to an uncertain problem.139
138. To be fair, Justice Stevens uncritically accepts the majority's suggestion that City of
Boerne "sets out the general test for determining whether Congress has enacted 'appropri-
ate' legislation." Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 652 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Other cases
interpreting City of Boerne are unclear about whether its analysis redefines the test for
appropriateness. Language in Justice O'Connor's Kimel opinion cuts both ways. At one
point she discusses City of Boerne and Congress' power to "enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment; soon afterward she states that City of Boerne found RFRA not to be "appro-
priate" § 5 legislation. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 (2000). Chief
Justice Rehnquist was equally vague in Garrett, see Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365
(2001), as is Justice Breyer, see id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 38
(1990) [hereinafter House Report]); id. (citing Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing
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To justify his foray into the legislative record, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited a portion of City of Boerne purportedly requiring Congress to com-
pile a record of constitutional violations before enacting § 5 legislation:
"the propriety of any § 5 legislation 'must be judged with reference to the
historical experience ... it reflects.'140 The passage quoted by the Chief
Justice is found not in City of Boerne's discussion of congruence and pro-
portionality, but in its explanation of why Congress' enforcement power
is not substantive in nature. 141 To illustrate how previous courts "ac-
knowledged" the remedial or preventive aspects of the enforcement
power, Justice Kennedy discussed cases in which the Court had upheld
remedial and preventive legislation.142
One example was South Carolina v. Katzenbach,143 in which the Court
rejected a claim by state authorities that Congress, under § 5, could do no
more than "strike down state [voting] statutes and procedures" that are
"discriminatory on their face or in practice." Chief Justice Warren ruled
that Congress could do anything it pleased to attack the evils compre-
hended by the constitutional guarantee (the Fifteenth Amendment), so
long as those means are appropriate under McCulloch.144 The Voting
Rights Act's "inventive" scheme of "stringent" remedies was entirely ap-
propriate, especially in light of Congress' inability to make headway in its
fight against racial discrimination in voting through previous legisla-
tion.145 For Justice Kennedy's purposes, it was sufficient that South Caro-
lina upheld remedial legislation. 146 He followed this discussion with a
litany of cases "acknowledg[ing]" Congress' authority to use remedial
and preventive measures in the exercise of its enforcement powers.' 47
Justice Kennedy concluded his argument by asserting that the Court's
case law did not acknowledge a substantive enforcement power.' 48
on H.R. 3886 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1990) [hereinafter
House Hearings]); id. at 640-641 (citing House Hearings at 32); id. at 641 (citing House
Hearings at 22); id. (citing S. Rep. No. 102-280, 1 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Report]); id.
(citing House Hearings at 22); id. (citing House Hearings at 36-37); id. (citing House Hear-
ings at 57); id. (citing House Hearings at 38); id. at 643 n.8 (citing House Hearings at 33);
id. (citing House Hearings at 43); id. (citing House Hearings at 34); id. (citing House Hear-
ings at 47); id. (citing House Hearings at 57); id. (citing House Hearings at 60); id. at 644
(citing House Hearings at 43); id. (citing House Hearings at 34 & 41; id. (citing House
Hearings at 58); id. (citing House Hearings at 37, n.158); id. (citing House Hearings at 38);
id. at 645 (citing Senate Report at 10); id. (citing House Report at 39); id. at 646 (citing
House Report at 38); id. at 647 n.10 (citing House Hearings at 55); id. at 648 (citing House
Report at 40); id. (citing Senate Report at 14).
140. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525).
141. See generally City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-29.
142. Id. at 526.
143. 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
144. Id. at 326.
145. Id. at 327, 315.
146. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525 ("Recent cases have continued to revolve around
the question of whether § 5 legislation can be considered remedial.").
147. Id. at 526-27.
148. Id. at 527-29.
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Florida Prepaid lifts the historical-experience test for proper § 5 legisla-
tion from dictum within City of Boerne's discussion of South Carolina.
Yet this purported 'guiding principle' for § 5 legislation 149 derives not
from South Carolina but from Justice Kennedy's gloss on Chief Justice
Warren's introductory remarks about the Voting Rights Act of 1965.150
South Carolina begins its discussion of the Act's appropriateness by stat-
ing that "[t]he propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged
by reference to the historical experience which it reflects.' 15' Without a
doubt, Congress confronted in 1965 "an insidious and pervasive evil" in
actual racial discrimination by certain States.' 52 But the "historical expe-
rience" to which Chief Justice Warren referred is the failed series of laws
passed by Congress in response to that evil. The Enforcement Act of
1870 failed because of "spotty and ineffective" enforcement long before
its repeal in 1894.153 For the next half-century, Congress stood on the
sidelines while Jim Crow eviscerated the promise of the Reconstruction
Amendments. When Congress invoked its enforcement powers in the
Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960 and 1964, it implemented stratagems that
"[did] little to cure the problem of voting discrimination.' 54 Its efforts
again "proved ineffective."' 155 Considering Congress' prior failures, the
Court found the Voting Rights Act's "complex scheme of stringent reme-
dies" to constitute an appropriate attempt to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment. 56
Read in context, the language in South Carolina refers specifically to
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the historical experience of legislative
ineffectiveness. When Justice Kennedy quotes this language in City of
Boerne's description of South Carolina, he substitutes "legislation
adopted under the Enforcement Clause" for "the Voting Rights Act of
1965,' 157 and thus transforms this peculiar remark into a general state-
ment about congressional power. When he notes that the legislative re-
cord contained evidence of "subsisting and pervasive discriminatory-
and therefore unconstitutional-use of literacy tests,"'1 58 he subtly mu-
tates the meaning behind the words "historical experience." When he
writes that the South Carolina Court "emphasized" the importance of his-
torical experience, 159 he changes the limited imperative of South Carolina
into a test for proper § 5 legislation. The original intent of the South
Carolina text ("[the new, unprecedented remedies were deemed neces-
149. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639-40 (stating that courts reviewing § 5 legislation
should be "guided by the principle" the Chief Justice takes from City of Boerne).
150. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 308 (1966)).
151. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
152. Id. at 309.
153. Id. at 310.
154. Id. at 313.
155. Id. at 314.
156. Id. at 315, 337.




sary given the ineffectiveness of the existing voting rights laws . . .") is
separated from the quoted language by a paragraph's discussion, rele-
gated to the status of an afterthought. 160
When Chief Justice Rehnquist dusts off the historical-experience prin-
ciple in Florida Prepaid, it becomes a guiding light for "any § 5 legisla-
tion."'161 From this skewed perspective, the PRA must be predicated by
constitutional violations or, at the least, a "pattern of patent infringement
by the States.' 162 Pouring new wine into old wineskins, the Court ap-
pears justified in poring through the legislative record to see whether
Congress "identif[ied] conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's substantive provisions" before invoking § 5 and adopting the
PRA. 163 Florida Prepaid relies on a mangled quote from City of Boerne's
discussion of the nonsubstantive nature of the enforcement power to sup-
port the Court's decision to overturn the PRA as a remedy without a
wrong.
This reliance on dictum, however, fails to persuade when it is consid-
ered in light of City of Boerne's explanation of the proportionality princi-
ple. After declaring that § 5 does not confer on Congress a power to
define the scope of the Constitution's guarantees, 164 City of Boerne asked
whether RFRA, with its "strong measures," was congruent and propor-
tional § 5 legislation.' 65 Justice Kennedy explained that the Voting
Rights Act of 1965-enacted to combat a well-documented pattern of un-
constitutional discrimination-contained termination dates and targeted
notoriously recalcitrant regions of the country. 166 By contrast, RFRA's
legislative record lacked examples of laws motivated by religious animus,
which one might expect to find considering the way RFRA ratcheted up
the States' exposure to liability.167
Perhaps suspecting that this exercise in contrasts might lead others to
require a record of unconstitutional behavior by the States, Justice Ken-
nedy noted that the inadequate legislative record "is not RFRA's most
serious shortcoming.' 1 68 RFRA's most glaring failure is its "sweeping
coverage," which puts "official actions of almost every description and
regardless of subject matter" at risk of invalidation by prima facie evi-
dence of a burden on free exercise. Yet even this explanation deserves a
word of caution: "[tihis is not to say, of course, that § 5 legislation re-
quires termination dates, geographic restrictions or egregious predi-
cates."'1 69 Such limits might be necessary when federal law "pervasively
prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or prevent un-
160. Id. at 526.
161. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 639.
164. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
165. Id. at 531.
166. Id. at 532-33.
167. Id. at 530-31.
168. Id. at 531.
169. Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
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constitutional state action.., to ensure that Congress' means are propor-
tionate to ends legitimate under § 5."170 But they are not always
required.
Were a court to suggest that it knew better than Congress when con-
gruent and proportional legislation should be adopted under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would violate the principle of judicial defer-
ence.'71 Requiring a record of unconstitutional acts by the States before
upholding § 5 legislation would also violate that principle. In this regard,
Florida Prepaid violates City of Boerne.172
3. Florida Prepaid Pays Insufficient Attention to the Question of
Congruence
Florida Prepaid's preoccupation with the legislative record distracts the
Court from the primary purpose of the congruence and proportionality
analysis-to determine whether putative § 5 legislation attempts to rede-
fine the substance of the constitutional guarantee to be enforced. The
Court underemphasizes the congruence analysis and treats the fact that
the PRA targeted constitutional conduct as proof that Congress exceeded
its powers under § 5. But City of Boerne requires a full understanding of
the constitutional guarantee to be enforced and the conception of consti-
tutionality embodied by a particular piece of § 5 legislation. Otherwise, it
is impossible to judge whether § 5 legislation substantively alters the con-
stitutional guarantee. By jumping ahead to the question of proportional-
ity, the Court gives the impression that Congress lacks power to regulate
constitutional state action in the absence of egregious predicates.
Florida Prepaid's superficial discussion of due process fails to mention
that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces three varieties of due-process
rights. First, certain substantive protections of the Bill of Rights apply to
170. Id.
171. Id. 531-32.
172. Florida Prepaid also creates a false distinction between the legislative record nec-
essary to justify prophylactic § 5 legislation and the record necessary to exercise remedial
powers. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526)
(saying that the record before Congress when enacting the PRA "suggests that the [Act]
does not respond to a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights' of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation").
Nothing in City of Boerne supports the contention that prophylactic legislation requires a
greater showing. Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions "ac-
knowledge[d] the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive measures to respond to
the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this coun-
try's history of racial discrimination." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526 (emphasis added).
As Justice Kennedy did with the quotation from South Carolina, the Chief Justice Rehn-
quist turns a specific statement into a general rule. But City of Boerne does not distinguish
between prophylactic and remedial legislation; City of Boerne distinguishes ordinary mea-
sures consistent with the constitutional mandate from strong measures that go beyond the
norm. The stronger the rule, the more egregious the record of actual deprivations must be.
Congress need not cite a record of constitutional violations to create a congruent § 5 rem-
edy and it need not compile evidence of widespread and persisting deprivations to enact
preventive legislation. See Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity, supra note 99, at 1347-48. See




the States by virtue of the doctrine of incorporation, including, inter alia,
the guarantee of Just Compensation for the taking of private property by
the government. 173 Second, the Due Process Clause contains a substan-
tive component that protects against "certain, arbitrary, wrongful govern-
ment actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them."1 74 Third, is a guarantee of fair procedures in any dep-
rivation of life, liberty or property.175 Though overlapping in some re-
spects (the first category may be seen as a subcategory of the second),
these varieties of due-process protections cover different rights and in-
volve different modes of analysis.
Florida Prepaid paints with broad strokes, making no obvious distinc-
tion among the varieties of due process. 176 In one breath, the Court dis-
cusses what can properly be called procedural due process; in the next, it
discusses cases relevant to substantive due-process claims. In neither in-
stance does the Court intimate that it has treated due process as anything
but a unitary concept. Furthermore, the Court's discussion of due pro-
cess tells us little about the substance of the guarantee. For example, the
Chief Justice remarks that the Due Process Clause is not violated until
due process is actually denied.177 While this statement accurately identi-
fies when the violation would be ripe for adjudication, it says virtually
nothing about what process is due when a State infringes a patent. It
avoids the very question posed by the Court-whether the assertion of
sovereign immunity by a State in a patent infringement suit would be
compatible with notions of due process. The Court also notes that a State
does not deprive someone of life, liberty or property by acting negli-
gently.178 It is true that this categorical statement applies where a claim is
predicated on a supposed violation of substantive due-process, but there
is no reason to believe that this standard has any relevance in the context
of a procedural due-process claim or a suit demanding just compensation
for a taking. As for the takings theory, the Court refused even to con-
sider whether the PRA could be understood as responsive to or designed
to prevent uncompensated takings. With little substantive discussion of
the various forms of due process, it is hard to tell whether the PRA con-
stitutes a "strong measure" and there is no way to tell whether it is a
proportional response to the record facing Congress. And a Congress
eager to fulfill its constitutional obligations is left scratching its head,
wondering how to enforce the Due Process Clause.
173. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). See also Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 337-40 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
174. Id. (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331).
175. Id.
176. All three forms are present, however. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641-42 n.7.
(just compensation); id. at 645 (substantive due process); id. at 642-43 (procedural due
process).
177. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
178. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
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4. Did the Court Reach the Right Result Anyway?
Florida Prepaid pays no more than lip service to City of Boerne's decla-
ration that Congress can regulate constitutional conduct as a means to
prevent or remedy unconstitutional conduct. It treats congruence and
proportionality analysis as a new construction of the term "appropriate."
It improperly focuses on issues relevant to the proportionality analysis
while making only a superficial inquiry into the PRA's congruence with
constitutional norms. It appears to require that Congress compile a re-
cord of constitutional violations before it can act. After Florida Prepaid,
in the words of Justice Stevens, "Congress' 'wide latitude' in determining
remedial and preventive measures ... has suddenly become very narrow
indeed." 179
Despite its misapplication of the City of Boerne analysis, Florida Pre-
paid can be understood to reach a defensible result in some respects.
First, the PRA does not enforce the constitutional guarantee of substan-
tive due process. It broadly prohibits conduct that is unlikely to effect an
unconstitutional deprivation without due process, as the concept of sub-
stantive due process has been interpreted by the modern Court. Second,
whether the PRA enforces the guarantee of procedural due process is less
clear than the Court suggests-however, the answer turns not on the state
of the record, but on how one views the power of Congress to implement
constitutional norms identified by the Supreme Court. Finally, the PRA
might or might not enforce the Just Compensation Clause. Whether any
incongruities are disproportionate depends on how broadly one construes
the trial court's discretion to award certain remedies. The next three
parts of this paper consider whether the PRA can be understood to en-
force these three varieties of due process. 180
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Federal Circuit, ruling below, interpreted the PRA to "prevent
states from depriving patent owners of their property without due process
through infringing acts.' 81 This holding suggests that infringement itself
is a violation of due process. In this regard, it has the ring of substantive
due process, which defines certain acts by the government as inherently
unfair. Though reversing the Federal Circuit, Florida Prepaid does not
directly address this argument. Instead, the Court simply states that "a
179. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 520).
180. Though the author concludes that the PRA probably fails to enforce the guaran-
tees of substantive due process and just compensation for takings of private property, he
makes no comment on the correlative remedial acts for copyright and trademark infringe-
ment. Only by a thorough analysis of the bases for infringement and compensation under
those laws can one determine their congruence with constitutional norms. When Congress
enacts new legislation, it would be well advised to consider each class of intellectual prop-
erty separately.
181. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
SMU LAW REVIEW
state actor's negligent act that causes unintended injury to a person's
property does not 'deprive' that person of property within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause.' 82 By imposing liability even when the in-
fringement is "innocent or at worst negligent," the PRA regulates con-
duct that is unlikely to be unconstitutional.183 Since the legislative record
does not support the conclusion that such legislation is a proportional
response to actual state infringements, the Court implies that the PRA
cannot be understood to enforce the constitutional protection against ar-
bitrary abuses of power.
Negligence is a concept alien to patent law. The defendant's state of
mind in a patent-infringement suit is relevant only at the remedy stage,
where willful infringements can result in an enhanced damage award.184
Florida Prepaid dismisses the importance of this distinction, focusing in-
stead on the fact that many of the acts regulated by the PRA are likely to
be negligent and hence constitutional. However, the important question
is not whether the PRA regulates unintentional infringement; Congress
has power under § 5 to regulate constitutional conduct to prevent or rem-
edy unconstitutional conduct. The important question is whether the
PRA's standard for liability is congruent with the constitutional standard
and, if it increases the States' liability beyond the constitutional obliga-
tion, whether the response is proportional in light of the evil to be eradi-
cated. To determine whether the PRA enforces the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee against arbitrary abuses of power, a court must
first identify the relevant constitutional standard; second, determine
whether the regulated conduct is likely to be unconstitutional; and third,
compare the statutory and constitutional obligations to evaluate the Act's
congruence. The proportionality inquiry then confirms whether the PRA
redefines substantive due process.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
The first step in a City of Boerne analysis is to identify the constitu-
tional guarantee to be enforced. Substantive due process "bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them."1 85 Unlike a violation of procedu-
ral due process, which does not 'ripen' until due process is denied, a sub-
stantive due process violation is complete as soon as the arbitrary action
is taken.186 Not all arbitrary deeds by government actors are prohibited
by the Due Process Clause. Rather, "[o]nly the most egregious official
182. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474
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conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional sense."' 187 The
"cognizable level of executive abuse of power" necessary to violate the
Due Process Clause is "that which shocks the conscience.' 88 Negligent
conduct is not particularly shocking; thus, "the Constitution does not
guarantee due care" on the part of state officials. 18 9 On the other hand,
intentional injury "unjustifiable by any government interest" is most
likely to shock the conscience. 190
An act's conscience-shocking quality should be evaluated in light of
traditional and contemporary executive behavior and the standards of
blame generally applied to conduct. 191 This judgment may be informed
by reference to "fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' ... and 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.'"192 This inquiry by nature is fact spe-
cific: what is shocking in one context might not be shocking in another.193
For example, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,194 a police officer was
breaking up a fight when two teenagers on a motorcycle approached at
high speed. The officer signaled to the boys to stop, but they maneuvered
around the officer's car and sped off. The officer turned on his emer-
gency lights and began pursuit at high speed. The chase last a little over a
minute, reaching speeds of 100 miles per hour in a residential neighbor-
hood. The motorcycle tipped when the driver attempted a sharp turn.
Although the driver got out of the way, the rider (Lewis) could not. The
officer's skidding patrol car propelled him 70 feet down the road, killing
him. Lewis' family brought a § 1983 claim based on the officer's deliber-
ate indifference to or reckless disregard for Lewis' substantive due-pro-
cess rights.195
Justice Souter began by noting that official acts can be sufficiently
shocking when the culpability of the state actor is somewhere between
mere negligence and intentional misconduct.196 Deliberate indifference
to the medical needs of a person in the custodial care of the State would
shock the conscience. 197 By contrast, the "unforeseen circumstances" in
Sacramento called for "instant judgment."'1 98 Under these circumstances,
187. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
188. Id. at 846.
189. Id. at 848-49.
190. Id. at 849.
191. Id. at 847, n.8.
192. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319,
325, 326 (1937)).
193. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (citing Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)).
194. Id. at 836-37.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 849.
197. Id. at 850.
198. Id. at 853.
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"even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful pur-
pose to spark the shock that implicates 'the large concerns of the gover-
nors and the governed." '199 Rather than draw a bright-line rule based
the defendant's state of mind, Sacramento requires a fact-specific inquiry
that focuses on abuses of power, measured by the "shock" test.
If the PRA is to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due-
process guarantee, it must aim to prevent or remedy arbitrary abuses of
power. Whether a state actor's conduct shocks the conscience depends
on a fact-intensive inquiry into the circumstances. While negligent acts
are categorically excluded as less than shocking, the likelihood of shock
increases as the state actor's culpability approaches an intentional abuse
of power.
B. Is THE REGULATED CONDUCT LIKELY TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The second step in the City of Boerne congruence analysis requires a
court to determine whether the regulated conduct is likely to be unconsti-
tutional. Under a substantive-due-process rationale, two state acts cov-
ered by the PRA might be characterized as an abuse of power: (1) the
assertion of sovereign immunity to defeat a claim and (2) the patent in-
fringement itself. Following Sacramento, we ask whether either of these
acts shocks the conscience.
A State's assertion of sovereign immunity is not shocking in the consti-
tutional sense, no matter how unfair it may seem from the perspective of
the damaged patentee. The State does not act arbitrarily or abuse its
power by following a policy that uniformly denies recovery to a patentee
who alleges infringement. 200 A policy requiring plaintiffs to petition the
legislature to waive its immunity to suit would not shock the conscience,
unless permission were granted in an inconsistent and arbitrary manner
indicating an abuse of power. Further, States can invoke sovereign im-
munity without offending procedural due process.201 If the assertion of
sovereign immunity were sufficiently shocking to constitute a violation of
substantive due process, the doctrine's potential inoffensiveness as a pro-
cedural matter would seem incoherent. Considering the Supreme Court's
recent expression of esteem for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 20 2
the suggestion that the sovereign-immunity defense shocks the con-
science is untenable.
As for the second possibility, most infringements will fail to shock the
conscience. The patent laws require no proof of culpability. This legisla-
tive choice reflects the systemic expectedness of infringement. That a re-
searcher might follow a line of inquiry or attempt to solve a problem in a
manner that leads to an ultimate reduction that coincides with the claims
of another patent is not surprising; it is, rather, to be expected. Such un-
199. Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)).
200. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring).
201. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 (1980).
202. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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intentional infringements would not violate substantive due process. Still,
certain state-sponsored infringements, such as the "willful" infringement
alleged in Florida Prepaid,20 3 might shock the conscience. Thus, while
most infringements would not inherently violate due process, some very
possibly could.
C. THE SHOCKS-THE-CONSCIENCE STANDARD AND THE PRA
Acknowledging that Congress can regulate the constitutional to pre-
vent or remedy the unconstitutional, the third step of the City of Boerne
congruence analysis asks whether the PRA appreciates the distinction be-
tween inoffensive infringements and shocking abuses of power. This in-
quiry involves a comparison of the statutory and constitutional standards
of liability. To establish a violation of the patent laws requires the same
proof whether the infringement is ordinary or intentional. If an invention
contains all the elements of a particular claim, then the defendant's in-
vention literally infringes the patented invention.2°4 Alternatively, if an
invention "performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result," the invention infringes the patent
under the doctrine of equivalents. 20 5 Under the PRA, a state infringer
can be held liable without proof of intent. 20 6
Though irrelevant to the question of infringement, intent matters in the
damages phase of litigation. A successful plaintiff can recover lost profits
or a reasonable royalty for ordinary infringement, 20 7 but a patentee who
demonstrates willful infringement can receive treble damages.20 8 In ex-
traordinary cases, the court also has discretion to award attorney's
fees. 209 The Court's dismissive consideration of remedies in Florida Pre-
paid notwithstanding, the PRA plainly distinguishes between conduct
that is more likely to offend substantive due process and acts that would
not.
This distinction, however, might not be as persuasive as it initially ap-
pears. First, the argument that willful infringements violate substantive
due process proves too much. Many deliberate infringements would re-
sult from uses eligible for the experimental-use defense. Where the use is
for research purposes, "to check the adequacy of the specification and the
203. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 653 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. See, e.g., London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
205. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
206. Intent is relevant to a finding of contributory infringement. See ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 290-94 (2d
ed. 2000).
207. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1484 (D.
Mass. 1990).
208. See, e.g., Kloster Speedsteel AB, Speedsteel of N.J., Inc. v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d
1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
209. 35 U.S.C. §§ 285 (1994).
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validity of the patent holder's claims about the invention, '210 as opposed
to "adapt[ing] the patented invention to the experimentor's business," 211
no liability attaches. From the constitutional perspective, such conduct is
not shocking. Second, putting the state infringer on the same ground as
the private infringer might not even articulate the most relevant analogy.
The State's assertion of sovereign immunity when a private infringer
would have to pay damages evokes images of stealing or an abuse of
power.212 Rather than compare infringers, however, Professor Volokh
suggests, controversially, that a more apt analogy would liken intellectual
property to real property.2 13 States have always possessed the power of
eminent domain with respect to real property. From this perspective, the
possibility that a State might co-opt a patent to public use is not shocking
at all.214 So long as just compensation is made, there is no constitutional
violation. An inventor deciding whether to apply for a patent (and thus
disclose his art to the world) must balance his desire to secure the bene-
fits of the patent system against the risk the government will exercise its
power to eminent domain to co-opt his patent for public use. Inventors
averse to this risk might prefer to keep the mysteries of their science to
themselves and rely on the protections of trade-secret law. But a taking,
in and of itself, is not "shocking" in the constitutional sense. In other
words, considered from the perspective of eminent domain, the PRA's
distinction between ordinary and willful infringement reflects no constitu-
tional distinction, since even willful (and compensated) infringements are
no abuse of power.
Even assuming that this distinction is viable, the PRA pervasively regu-
lates state conduct that would be constitutional under the substantive-
due-process rationale. To ensure that the PRA does not accomplish a
legislative redefinition of substantive due process, it is necessary to look
for signs that the PRA is a proportional response to an evil at hand.
D. Is THE PRA PROPORTIONAL LEGISLATION?
The PRA-in an attempt to prevent arbitrary abuses of power-regu-
lates conduct that is unlikely to violate the guarantee of substantive due
process. It regulates all infringements, demanding a damage remedy irre-
spective of intent, despite the fact that the vast majority of infringements
do not shock the conscience. By defining ordinary infringement as a
wrong redressible by damages and making willful infringement simply
more wrongful, the PRA substantially lowered the threshold for liability
210. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Ex-
perimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1078 (1989).
211. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
212. See, e.g., Joan N. Williams, A License to Steal?, 25 DAYTON L. REV. 283 (2000);
Christina Bohannon & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional in Light of Sem-
inole Tribe?, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435 (1999).
213. Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1161 (2000).
214. Id. at 1167.
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and expanded the States' obligations. Regulating less-than-shocking in-
fringements that do not implicate the "large concerns of the governors
and the governed" 215 in the name of preventing egregious abuses of
power, the PRA appears to alter the meaning of substantive due process.
Given the incongruity between the constitutional norm and the statutory
obligation, the proportionality phase of the City of Boerne analysis asks
whether the PRA is a proportional attempt to prevent or remedy a con-
stitutional wrong.
Florida Prepaid indicates that infringements by state actors are infre-
quent, and unconstitutional infringements less frequent.216 Congress did
not tailor the PRA to address only willful infringements; neither is it di-
rected at States that tend to infringe more frequently than others.217 In-
stead, it regulates all infringements by state actors, nationwide,
indefinitely. Subjecting the States to suit in federal court when many of
the alleged infringements would result in no liability, all in the name of
preventing abuses of power, can be considered a disproportionate re-
sponse to the problem of state patent infringement, even if a willful in-
fringer is treated more harshly than an ordinary infringer. Congress'
decision to subject the States to liability under the PRA appears to rede-
fine their substantive due-process obligations. Consequently, the PRA
fails to enforce the substantive component of the Due Process Clause,
and, were this the only theory for sustaining the PRA, the Act's abroga-
tion of Eleventh Amendment immunity would be void.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In Florida Prepaid, the Court held that there is "no reason why Con-
gress might not legislate against... deprivation [of patent rights] without
due process under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 18 However, con-
tinued the Court, state-sponsored deprivation of life, liberty or property
does not by itself give rise to the constitutional violation: "'what is uncon-
stitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of
law." 219 A State does not violate the Constitution when it infringes a
patent. "Instead, only where the State provides no remedy, or only inad-
equate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their
patent could a deprivation of property without due process result. '220
Implicitly rejecting a substantive-due-process rationale, this argument
focuses on procedural due process. The Court's articulation of the due-
process principle is correct, as far as it goes. But it says nothing about
215. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
216. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646. But see id. at 656 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Con-
gress found that state infringement of patents was likely to increase.").
217. Id. at 647.
218. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.
219. Id. at 643 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (emphasis
omitted)).
220. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539-41 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 539 (1984)).
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what makes procedures constitutionally adequate in a particular situa-
tion. Instead of weighing the constitutionality of a process that allows the
State to interpose sovereign immunity between its infringement of a pat-
ent and the patentee's right to recovery, the Court asks whether Congress
looked into the availability and quality of state-based remedies for the
"wrong" committed when a State infringes a patent. Because the legisla-
tive record never mentions such remedies, the Court concludes that the
PRA was not responsive to any constitutional violations. This faulty rea-
soning allows the Court to avoid deciding whether "the use of sovereign
immunity to deny patent owners compensation for the invasion of their
patent rights" is likely to be unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause.22' The answer to this question hinges not on the state of the re-
cord but on an understanding of procedural due process.
To determine whether the PRA enforces this aspect of the due-process
guarantee, we must first consider the statute's congruence with the Con-
stitution: we must identify the constitutional standard, determine whether
the regulated conduct is likely to be unconstitutional, and compare the
statutory and constitutional obligations for signs of congruence. Then,
this congruence analysis must be considered in light of the PRA's propor-
tionality to determine whether the PRA redefines the constitutional guar-
antee. If not, the PRA should have been upheld as valid enforcement
legislation.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Justice Stevens has described a violation of procedural due process as
"a defect so serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamen-
tally unfair, a defect so basic that we are forced to conclude that the dep-
rivation occurred without due process. '222 Unfortunately, the measure of
procedural fairness is not so easily stated, for due process, "'unlike some
legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.' 2 23 It is "flexible and calls for such pro-
cedural protections as the particular situation demands. ' 224 Instead of
applying a bright-line rule, the Court measures the fairness of a given set
of procedures by balancing factors articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
221. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640.
222. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., concurring).
223. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. V. McGrath, 321 U.s. 123, 162 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
224. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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entail.22 5
Justice Brennan identified the most basic requirement of due process
of law to be "'the opportunity to be heard" 22 6 at "'a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner." 227 In other words, "[t]he opportunity to
be heard must be tailored to the capacities and the circumstances of those
who are to be heard. '228 In Mathews, Justice Powell judged the pre-ter-
mination proceedings at issue to be "elaborate. '229 Because the proce-
dures provided "an effective process for asserting [Mathews'] claim prior
to any administrative action" as well as "a right to an evidentiary hearing
[and] subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim [became]
final," the Court deferred to "the good-faith judgments of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare
programs.'"230
Thus, the constitutional standard in a procedural-due-process challenge
prescribes no hard-and-fast rule, although predeprivation hearings are
generally preferred. 231 Constitutionality depends on a balancing of inter-
ests, guided by the principle that the opportunity to be heard must be
'meaningful' in the sense that they are tailored to the capacities of the
person whose interests are subject to deprivation.
B. Is THE REGULATED CONDUCT LIKELY TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The second step in the City of Boerne congruence analysis asks whether
the regulated conduct is likely to be unconstitutional. Thus, the question
is whether a State would violate procedural due process by interposing its
sovereign immunity between an injured patentee and his remedy. In
Martinez v. California,232 a unanimous Court held meritless a claim that a
"State's immunity statute is unconstitutional when applied to defeat a
tort claim arising under state law." Justice Stevens, who authored Marti-
nez, subsequently elaborated on the constitutionality of the common-law
sovereign-immunity defense in his Daniels concurrence: "There is no rea-
son to believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 of that Amendment
should be construed to suggest that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair. '233 In other words, a
state policy allowing the sovereign-immunity defense is not ipso facto un-
constitutional by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
225. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
226. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914)).
227. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
228. Id. at 268-69.
229. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 (1976).
230. Id. at 349.
231. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).
232. 444 U.S. 277, 283 (1980).
233. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342-43 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Clause. Rather, the constitutionality of such a policy depends on the re-
suits of the Mathews balancing test.
The Mathews balancing test requires consideration of three factors: (1)
the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through
the procedures used and the probable value of alternative procedural
safeguards, and (3) the State interests at stake.
1. The Private Interest at Stake
A court evaluating the fairness of a State's procedures for depriving a
citizen of property must first identify the private interest at stake. A re-
view of the Supreme Court's description of the private interests at stake
in landmark procedural-due-process cases indicates how courts should
consider this issue.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 234 the plaintiff alleged wrongful termination of
financial assistance under a federally assisted state welfare program. The
Court described the private interest at stake as a statutory entitlement,
declining to characterize the funds as a gratuity or privilege undeserving
of the protections of due process.235 According to Justice Brennan, wel-
fare benefits for the eligible recipient constitute "the means to obtain es-
sential food, clothing, housing, and medical care ... the very means by
which to live . . ",236 Lacking "independent resources, his situation be-
comes immediately desperate. '237 Mathews v. Eldridge38 involved the
suspension of federal disability benefits administered by a state agency.
The Court noted that disability benefits are not based on financial need
and identified a variety of alternative sources of income.2 39 Since "full
retroactive relief" is available to the person whose benefits were wrong-
fully terminated, Justice Powell identified the private interest at stake as
"the uninterrupted receipt" of disability benefits "pending the final ad-
ministrative decision on his claim. '2 40 Insofar as the interests at stake in
these two cases are so similar, and the outcomes so different, it is hard to
escape the impression that much rides on how the private interest is
characterized.
In a patent-infringement suit, the private interest at stake is the paten-
tee's right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale,
or importing the claimed invention.241 The exclusive rights conferred by
a patent are of limited duration: the term of a patent is a mere twenty
years from the date of application. That said, it is also true that a patent
does not confer an affirmative right to do anything. A patentee might
still need to pass regulatory review before being allowed to produce the
234. 397 U.S. 254, 256 (1970).
235. Id. at 262.
236. Id. at 264.
237. Id.
238. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
239. Id. at 340-41.
240. Id at 340.
241. See generally MERGES, supra note 205, at 132-34.
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invention. It is also possible for a patented invention to be covered by a
preexisting (or blocking) patent. Nevertheless, patents are generally val-
uable, not simply because of the monopolistic profits that can be reaped
during the term of the patent, but often because of the investment that
has gone into creating the invention. Protecting patents allows inventors
to recoup research and development expenditures. A patent is a valua-
ble, federally created property interest protected by an elaborate legal
framework.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and Probable Value of Other
Procedures
The second factor courts should consider under Mathews is the risk of
erroneous deprivation and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedures. The cases cited in Florida Prepaid speak to this
aspect of the Mathews analysis. Parratt v. Taylor2 4 2 and Hudson v.
Palmer243 teach that postdeprivation procedures may be constitutionally
sufficient if there is no realistic opportunity for predeprivation hear-
ings. 244 In Parratt, a state prison official negligently lost a prisoner's
hobby materials. 245 In Hudson, a prisoner claimed that an officer inten-
tionally destroyed his personal property during a shakedown. 246 . In
neither case was it possible for the State to anticipate the unauthorized
deprivation. The Court found no constitutional infirmity because
postdeprivation remedies were available.
Florida Prepaid also cited Zinermon v. Burch,247 a § 1983 case involv-
ing a man who alleged that he had been voluntarily admitted to a mental
hospital despite the fact that he was incompetent to make such a decision.
Though not plead as a procedural-due-process claim, the Court took the
occasion to elaborate on the limits of Parratt and Hudson. The dissent
insisted that the alleged "random and unauthorized departures from oth-
erwise unimpugned and established state procedures" put this case
squarely within the Parratt doctrine,248 but Justice Blackmun found the
circumstances distinguishable. 249 Unlike Parratt and Hudson, it was not
unpredictable, under the facts of Zinermon, that an incompetent person
might seek admission to a mental hospital. Predeprivation process was
not impossible. And since the State delegated its authority to deprive
Burch of his liberty, the conduct of the hospital administrators could not
be said to be unauthorized. Zinermon limits the scope of the Parratt doc-
trine.250 Predeprivation procedures are probably constitutionally re-
242. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
243. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
244. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).
245. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530.
246. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 520.
247. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 120-21.
248. Id. at 141 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 136-39.
250. But see Bohannon & Cotter, supra note 212, at 1486-88 (discussing "narrow" and
"expansive" readings of Zinermon).
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quired if deprivations are authorized and predictable and process is not
impossible. The fact that a state employee deviates from an established
policy will not shield the policy from review.
Patent infringement is a deprivation of property.251 Unless an equita-
ble defense (such as experimental use) can be asserted, infringement is by
definition erroneous, and the risk of erroneous deprivation is coextensive
with the risk of infringement. In determining the probable value of addi-
tional or substitute procedures, a Mathews-Zinermon inquiry will look
into the state actors' authority to deprive the private interest, the predict-
ability of erroneous deprivations, and the possibility of predeprivation
process. First, state employees who might infringe a patent are not likely
to be expressly authorized to deprive a patentee of this property in the
same way the hospital administrators were authorized to deprive Burch
of his liberty. However, certain state actors, such as university research-
ers or administrative engineers, are likely to face infringement risks when
acting within the scope of their employment. Second, the risk of infringe-
ment is predictable. As long as "unlicensed experiments [are not] con-
ducted with a view to the adaptation of the patented invention to the
experimentor's business,1252 no erroneous deprivation occurs because in-
ventors can take advantage of the experimental-use defense. The deci-
sion to exploit an invention for commercial purposes provides a
predictable occasion for determining the risk of erroneous infringement.
Third, predeprivation procedures are possible. A general screening pro-
cess might alert state actors to the possibility of infringement and steer
them away from using the invention or process in a manner that would
surrender the experimental-use defense. Alternatively, the State could
seek to secure a license from the patentee. The risk of erroneous depri-
vation is palpable, and the value of additional procedures is significant.
3. State Interests at Stake
Finally, the Mathews inquiry considers the State's interests. In
Goldberg, Justice Brennan described the governmental interest in terms
of the Constitution's charge to Congress to "'promote the General Wel-
fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity.'" 2 53 The government also has an interest in making sure that benefits
are not erroneously interrupted.254 Justice Brennan acknowledged the
countervailing interest in "conserving fiscal and administrative re-
sources. '2 55 In Mathews, Justice Powell focused on the government's in-
terest in "conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources. ' 256 Thus,
the government's interests include the policies to be furthered and the
burden imposed by the proposed procedural safeguards.
251. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642.
252. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
253. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (quoting U.S. CONST. preamble).
254. Id. at 266.
255. Id. at 265.
256. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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On the one hand, States have an interest in supporting the federal pat-
ent system. The Constitution grants Congress power to regulate patents
to promote progress in the sciences and useful arts. Pursuant to this au-
thority, Congress has created an elaborate system by which the rights of
patentees can be vindicated. Maintaining uniformity in the application of
the patent laws promotes confidence in the system; an inventor is more
likely to disclose her invention in a patent application if she is confident
that her rights will be enforced. On a more practical level, States have an
interest in protecting the patent rights of their citizens because States that
fail to do so will be less likely to attract or retain technology- and re-
search-intensive businesses. Independent of these considerations, the
States have an interest in the continuing vitality of the federal system and
in protecting privileges and immunities conferred by the United States.
On the other hand, States have a significant interest in avoiding the
costs of an elaborate pre-deprivation process. Monitoring patent disclo-
sures to anticipate literal infringements, not to mention possible applica-
tions of the doctrine of equivalents, might outweigh the benefits of a
screening process. Preliminary screenings might also alert the plaintiff's
bar to the possibility of infringement and embroil the State in additional
litigation. Postdeprivation remedies implicate a State's discretion in allo-
cating its resources because inverse condemnations and infringement
suits subject the State to the demands of a single patentee.
4. Sovereign Immunity and Procedural Due Process
In the abstract, it is hard to apply the Mathews balancing test with any
precision. However, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions
about pre- and postdeprivation procedures in the context of patent in-
fringement. First, patents constitute a valuable federal property right.
Second, it is possible to predict when certain infringements are likely and
to implement pre-deprivation procedures to obtain a license or otherwise
avoid infringement. Then again, it is unlikely that the state actors at
greatest risk of infringement possess sufficient authority to deprive paten-
tees of their property. Third, the States have a significant interest in re-
specting the patent rights of their citizens. Countervailing state interests
include conserving public resources and finances, especially when the
costs and administrative burdens associated with a pre-deprivation rem-
edy are likely to be enormous and the benefit uncertain. Postdeprivation
remedies would more precisely address the need for compensation, al-
though such procedures may themselves be burdensome.
Weighing the Mathews factors, it appears that a predeprivation remedy
may ask too much of a State. Though the private interest is significant,
the risk of erroneous deprivation is small (assuming the experimental-use
defense would apply most of the time) and the burden imposed on the
States is great. Consequently, a State's decision not to provide
predeprivation process would likely not offend the Constitution.
States may forego predeprivation process only if they provide constitu-
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tionally adequate postdeprivation remedies.25 7 However, a State has a
significant interest in avoiding trials and damage awards, not to mention
protecting its sovereignty. A State might well choose to interpose its sov-
ereign immunity between an aggrieved patentee and his recovery. Under
Martinez, a policy precluding recovery in a state-based tort claim against
the sovereign would not inherently violate the guarantee of procedural
fairness. Whether the sovereign immunity defense is constitutional de-
pends on a Mathews balancing test, where the private property interest
and the State's interest in supporting the federal patent system are
weighed against the State's interest in conserving resources.
Assuming that state interests in avoiding litigation and damage awards
outweigh the private property interest and the State's countervailing in-
terests in the federal system, a State would not violate procedural due
process by pleading sovereign immunity in a state tort action predicated
on patent infringement. Even if procedures would reduce the risk of in-
fringement, a uniform policy denying relief could, under these assump-
tions, pass constitutional muster.
Alternatively, one might determine that the state interest in avoiding
damage liability pales in comparison with the need for a strong federal
patent system with a uniform remedy for infringement. The State's inter-
est in not being hauled into court by a citizen might also be seen as trivial
in comparison with the supposed impracticality of requiring States to im-
plement costly, burdensome, and possibly ineffective predeprivation pro-
cedures.258 Under this interpretation, the sovereign-immunity defense
would be unconstitutional, despite Martinez.
The issues in Goldberg and Mathews were practically identical, but the
results quite different. It is hard to escape the impression that the result
depended to a great extent on how the issue was framed. Here, too, the
result hinges on how the decision maker characterizes the interests at
stake. From one perspective, the assertion of sovereign immunity to de-
feat a patent-infringement claim is absolutely constitutional. From the
other view, such an act is likely to be unconstitutional in the context of a
State's infringement of the federal right conferred by a patent.
C. THE MATHEWS TEST AND THE PRA
The third step in the City of Boerne congruence analysis asks whether
the statutory framework exhibits a consonance with the obligations im-
posed by the Constitution. In determining whether the PRA's abrogation
of the States' sovereign immunity is congruent with the Constitution's
guarantee of procedural due process, it is perhaps helpful to consider
what Congress did not require when it enacted the PRA. Congress did
not require a threshold inquiry into the constitutionality of the State's
257. Id. at 333.
258. The Chief Justice declared such considerations relevant in the Article I context but
unpersuasive in the Fourteenth Amendment context. However, such policy considerations
are the meat and potatoes of a Mathews balancing test.
[Vol. 55
2002] REDRESSING STATE PATENT INFRINGEMENT 557
assertion of sovereign immunity in each patent infringement case. The
PRA does not require courts to consider the relative importance of a
particular patent. Court are not allowed to find that patent A is a private
interest of immense value because it yields returns to the patentee in the
form of multimillion-dollar licensing fees, whereas, in another case, the
private interest at stake with patent B is not all that important because
the patentee cannot manage to meet certain regulatory hurdles and thus
cannot market his invention. The PRA does not require plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the risk of infringement by a particular state actor is
great. The injured patentee need not prove that predeprivation proce-
dures are constitutionally preferred because infringement is authorized
and predictable and the implementation of predeprivation procedures is
possible. The PRA does not require plaintiffs to prove the absence of a
countervailing state interest. Neither must the state defendant argue that
such interests as judicial economy or preservation of the public fisc justify
its assertion of sovereign immunity in this particular case. In short, the
PRA does not require threshold determinations that the State's assertion
of sovereign immunity would violate procedural due process on the basis
of the particular facts of each case.
Instead, the PRA states simply that state actors "shall not be immune,
under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States
• ..from suit in Federal court ...for infringement of a patent under
section 271, or for any other violation under this title. '259 Section 296(a)
of the Patent Act does not parrot the constitutional guarantee. It im-
poses a general rule that prohibits certain behavior on the part of the
States-the assertion of sovereign immunity in a patent-infringement
suit-which may or may not be constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process.
Assuming that state interests in avoiding litigation and damage awards
outweigh the private property interest at stake and the State's interest in
the federal patent system, a State would not violate procedural due pro-
cess by pleading sovereign-immunity to defeat a patent-infringement
claim. Section 296(a) would thus target behavior that is likely to be con-
stitutional. By denying States the right to invoke the sovereign-immunity
defense, the PRA utilizes a rather strong measure to accomplish its pur-
poses and appears to declare the sovereign-immunity defense procedur-
ally unfair. The proportionality analysis tends to confirm the substantive
effect of the PRA under these assumptions. As Florida Prepaid noted,
Congress compiled only a scant record of infringement by the States,
much less the widespread and persistent deprivation of constitutional
rights sufficient to justify strong measures. Further, it is hard to imagine
any violation of procedural due process under these circumstances so
long as a State consistently applies its policy of sovereign immunity in
postdeprivation procedures. Rather than preventing or remedying viola-
tions of procedural due process, the PRA appears to redefine the consti-
259. Pub. L. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4230 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994)).
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tutional guarantee. Under these assumptions, the PRA is not valid § 5
legislation and cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. 260
Alternatively, one might consider the PRA to be the product of an
implicit Mathews analysis on the part of Congress. If Congress were to
weigh the competing interests, it might reasonably conclude that the as-
sertion of sovereign immunity to defeat a patent-infringement claim is
likely to be unconstitutional. To reach this result, Congress need not
redefine due process; it need only apply the existing constitutional rule.
By providing a forum for the adjudication of patent-infringement suits
and disallowing the sovereign-immunity defense, the PRA would enforce
the constitutional guarantee of procedural fairness.
City of Boerne's proportionality analysis ensures that enforcement leg-
islation does not effectively redefine the constitutional rule. With no risk
of redefinition, however, the proportionality inquiry should express "'due
regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide"'
how and when enforcement legislation should be enacted. 261 When Con-
gress determines that the assertion of sovereign immunity in a patent-
infringement suit is likely to be an unconstitutional deprivation of due
process, Congress need only show that there is a risk that States will at-
tempt to plead sovereign immunity. A state-by-state study of state proce-
dures might help demonstrate the likelihood of unconstitutionality. But
where the targeted state conduct is likely to be unconstitutional, geo-
graphical limits or sunset provisions may be superfluous.
However, if Congress possesses authority to apply the Mahers test and
make a good-faith determination about the relative merits of the compet-
ing interests at stake-concluding that the assertion of sovereign immu-
nity would be a violation of procedural due process in a particular
instance-Seminole Tribe would seem quite vulnerable. Such a power in
Congress to apply constitutional rules to draw a conclusion about the
constitutionality of a particular policy choice might provide "a direct end-
run around Seminole's holding that Article I powers may not be em-
ployed to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's limit on the federal judicial
power. '262 But it is a power consistent with City of Boerne, and Congress
may exercise it without redefining the constitutional rule.
What was said of Seminole Tribe can be said of Florida Prepaid: "This
260. Describing abrogation itself as a strong measure, however, seems to rig the analy-
sis. Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment only by enforcing the Fourteenth.
One does not enforce by redefining. One risks redefining by using strong measures. The
risk of redefinition demands a record of constitutional violations and a tailored response.
If abrogating the Eleventh Amendment is itself a strong measure, it stands to reason that
Congress can only do so when facing a record of constitutional violations and must even
then tailor its response to the evil to be prevented. Following this reasoning, the congru-
ence phase of the City of Boerne analysis becomes irrelevant.
261. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207
(1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.)).
262. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 139 F.3d 504, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated and
remanded, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam), reaching same result upon
reconsideration, 204 F.3d 601 (2000) (rejecting Congress' abrogation of sovereign immunity
in copyright-infringement suits).
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case is about power. '263 The validity of Congress' abrogation of the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the PRA comes down to the
question of who decides. Should the States, Congress, or the Supreme
Court decide whether one set of interests is outweighed by another? Ma-
thews suggests that this question is political in nature, best decided by the
legislature. 264 Given the federal policy implications of the patent regime,
it seems reasonable that the federal legislature should decide whether as-
sertion of sovereign immunity in the patent-infringement context is likely
to be unconstitutional. Assuming that Congress can apply constitutional
rules to state action to determine what kind of legislation enforces a par-
ticular guarantee, it is possible to conceive of the PRA as valid § 5 legisla-
tion enforcing procedural due process. The current Supreme Court,
however, seems unwilling to defer to congressional application of consti-
tutional rules.2 65
V. JUST COMPENSATION
CSB argued that an infringing State "'takes' the property in the patent
without paying just compensation" when it pleads sovereign immunity.2 66
The Supreme Court, however, chose not to consider CSB's takings claim.
Congress did not purport to enforce this guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Solicitor General declined to defend it on those
grounds. 267 Thus, the Court suggested that consideration of the Just
Compensation Clause as a basis for the Patent Remedy Act would be
inappropriate.
CSB's claim nevertheless merits consideration. The Fifth Amendment
provides in relevant part: "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation. 2 68 This guarantee has applied to the
States for more than a century.269 Whether the PRA actually enforces
the Just Compensation Clause depends on its congruence and proportion-
ality with the Constitution. The congruence inquiry asks three basic
questions. First, what is the standard for a violation of the Just Compen-
sation Clause? Second, given this standard, is the conduct targeted by the
PRA likely to be unconstitutional? Third, does the statutory framework
express a congruence with the constitutional standard? The second phase
of the City of Boerne analysis looks for indicia of proportionality to en-
sure that pervasive regulation of constitutional conduct does not operate
to redefine the Just Compensation Clause. Whether the PRA enforces
the Takings/Just Compensation Clause depends on how broadly one con-
263. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (deferring to "good faith judg-
ments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social-welfare
programs").
265. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 377 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
266. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641-42.
267. Id. at 642 n.7.
268. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
269. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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strues the discretion of courts to award remedies not authorized under
the Supreme Court's just-compensation cases.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
A City of Boerne analysis of the just-compensation rationale begins
with a description of the constitutional guarantee to be enforced. The
Takings Clause "confirms" the power of government to appropriate prop-
erty from private owners to itself.270 It "is designed not to limit the gov-
ernmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to
a taking. '271 The Just Compensation Clause, on the other hand, reflects
the principle that government action should not be arbitrary: its "central
aim ... is to limit the 'government's power to isolate particular individu-
als for sacrifice to the general good." 272 Whenever (1) private property
(2) is taken (3) for public use (4) by a state actor duly authorized by law,
(5) just compensation must be made.273 To understand the constitutional
guarantee, it is necessary to examine each of these components.
1. Private Property
The "private property" element of a takings claim is typically self-evi-
dent. Most takings claims involve disputes over real property.274 The Su-
preme Court has classified a variety of property interests owned by
nongovernmental persons or entities as private property covered by the
Takings Clause, including, inter alia, a real estate lien, 275 a materialman's
lien,276 valid contracts,277 trade secrets278 and Indian artifacts. 279
In Andrus v. Allard,280 the Court considered whether federal laws ef-
fected a taking by prohibiting the sale of artifacts containing the feathers
of protected birds. Although the Secretary of the Interior challenged the
standing of the appellees to assert a constitutional claim with respect to
feathers acquired after the passage of the pertinent congressional acts,
the Court rejected the contention without questioning the existence of a
270. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1102 (4th ed. 1998).
271. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
272. Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellec-
tual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe: The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849,
870-71 (1998) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-6, at
605 (2d ed. 1988)).
273. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, _ 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001). See also
Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amend-
ment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 535 (1998) (footnotes omitted) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04, 1014-16 (1984)).
274. E.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at _, 121 S. Ct. at 2454-55.
275. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935).
276. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44 (1960).
277. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
278. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004 (1984).
279. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 54 (1979).
280. See id. at 54-55.
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property interest.2 81
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Court determined that the pesticide
manufacturer possessed a property interest in trade secrets. The Court
looked primarily to Missouri state law to demarcate the extent of Mon-
santo's property interest but had little difficulty with the suggestion that
any such property was covered by the Takings Clause. 282 The Court inti-
mated that the Clause is as broad as the concept of property itself, citing
Blackstone's definition of property to include all "products of an individ-
ual's 'labour and invention.'" 283
The Court has long recognized that the term "property" in the Takings
Clause embraces not simply the "thing" owned but the bundle of rights
inhering to the owner by virtue of her relation to that thing.284 Simply
put, private property comprises the bundle of rights associated with prop-
erty. The Court has treated these rights separately: "where an owner pos-
sesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of
the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety. 2 85 For example, though the law complained of in Andrus inter-
fered with the right to sell private property, it did not require the surren-
der of the artifacts and there was "no physical invasion or restraint" upon
the artifacts-the appellees could still "possess and transport their prop-
erty" as well as "donate or devise the protected birds." 286
2. Possessory and Regulatory Takings
The Supreme Court recognizes two classes of takings claims: posses-
sory and regulatory takings.2 87 Heald and Wells define the possessory
taking as "[a] government confiscation of property or a physical occupa-
tion of property" and suggest that it "constitutes the strongest sort of
claim for compensation. 2 88 A standard example of such a taking would
be the government's exercise of its power of eminent domain to condemn
land for a flood-control basin. Regulatory takings may occur when gov-
ernment actions go "too far" in limiting the use of property.2 89 Gener-
ally, a compensable 'taking' arises when regulation "denies all
economically beneficial or productive use" of property.290 Elimination of
all viable use is not absolutely necessary; where some value remains,
courts consider "the character of the governmental action, its economic
281. See id. at 64 n.21.
282. 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984).
283. Id. at 1003 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405).
284. See id. (citing United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)).
285. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
286. Id. at 66.
287. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992);
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 269, at 1123-67; Heald & Wells, supra note 271, at
865-66.
288. Heald & Wells, supra note 271, at 865. See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, __, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001).
289. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
290. Lucas, 505 U.S at 1015.
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impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions" in determining whether a taking has occurred.291 Such a taking
might be effected when a regulatory body conditions a development per-
mit on the granting of an easement 292 or repeatedly denies development
permits in a manner that indicates that permission will never be
granted.293 Neither a possessory nor a regulatory taking need be perma-
nent for the right to just compensation to attach.2 94
3. Public Use
The theory of eminent domain rests on the assumption that the taking
will be for a public use.2 95 The scope of the public-use requirement is
"coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers. '296 The tak-
ing need only have "a conceivable public character. '2 97 Professor Cotter
suggests that "it is difficult to imagine many uses by a state officer that
potentially serve the minimal state interest necessary for them to be
viewed as falling within the scope of his employment but which would
not, at the same time, possess the 'conceivable public character' necessary
to be deemed 'public."' 298
4. Duly Authorized by Law
To be cognizable under the Takings Clause, the deprivation must be
"duly authorized by law."'299 As Professor Cotter notes, "the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition of uncompensated takings 'is directed against
the Government, and not against individuals or public officers proceeding
without the authority of legislative enactment."' 30 0 Unless the depriva-
tion is authorized "expressly or by necessary implication" by an act of the
legislature, it "is not the act of the Government."' 30 1 One approach to
this issue would define authorization to embrace only those acts that are
"substantially in compliance with the powers granted to them by congres-
291. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980). See also Penn Central
Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
292. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
293. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 695-98
(1999).
294. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (temporary occupa-
tion); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 319 (1987).
295. Cf. Volokh, supra note 213, at 1167-69 (finding the entire concept problematic and
suggesting it be restricted to "rare situations of serious public need").
296. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984) (quoting Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
297. Id.
298. Cotter, supra note 273, at 569. See generally DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note
269, at 1105-12; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property:
The Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 711-17 (1989).
299. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016.
300. Cotter, supra note 273, at 569 (quoting Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322,
335-336 (1910)).
301. Hooe, 218 U.S. at 336.
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sional statute or constitutional provision. ' 30 2 This narrow view of the
term might exclude acts outside the job description. A more liberal view
would find authority in any act "sufficiently authorized by law to justify
attributing it to the [government]. '30 3 This view would require the legis-
lature to specifically limit power to act in a certain manner for the act to
be unauthorized. 30 4 Monsanto appears to endorse the latter view. 30 5
Thus, acts reasonably traceable to a statutory delegation of authority
should be considered "duly authorized by law" unless the organic statute
expressly withholds the power to effect a taking.30 6
5. Just Compensation
If a state actor, duly authorized by law, takes private property for pub-
lic use, the State must make just compensation to comply with its consti-
tutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The taking itself
is not unconstitutional-it is the failure to provide just compensation that
offends the Constitution.30 7 The property owner must pursue the State's
compensatory procedures before alleging that the State violated its duty
to provide just compensation. 30 8
The measure of just compensation is fair market value,30 9 that is, "what
a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller. '310 As Judge Posner
explained, "compensation in the constitutional sense is ... not full com-
pensation, for market value is not the value that every owner of property
attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner
attaches to his property."' 311 Consequently, the constitutional concept of
just compensation does not embrace consequential damages, 312 punitive
damages,313 legal costs314 or attorney's fees. 315 However, the Court has
302. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
303. Id. at 1556 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. See id. at 1555-56 (footnotes omitted) (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 705 (1949)).
305. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (citing Larson).
306. The risk for patent holders, obviously, is that the State would withhold authority to
effect a taking via patent infringement. A patentee who suffers infringement at the hands
of a state actor who acts without authority would be left to argue ratification of the act by
the State or to sue the state official, who is unlikely to have resources to pay a judgment.
307. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
308. Id. at 195.
309. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
310. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
311. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Pos-
ner, J.).
312. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984).
313. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
314. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1979); Dohany v. Rogers, 281
U.S. 362 (1930). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1994) (allowing recovery of reasonable litigation
expenses in inverse condemnation actions against the United States). Section 4654 is irrel-
evant in the context of state takings.
315. Dohany, 281 U.S. at 368.
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inferred a right to interest under the Just Compensation Clause. 316
B. Is THE REGULATED CONDUCT LIKELY TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The second question in the City of Boerne congruence analysis con-
cerns the constitutionality of the regulated conduct. Here, the targeted
conduct is "state infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immu-
nity to deny patent owners compensation. ' 317 This inquiry can be sepa-
rated into two questions. First, does state infringement of a patent
constitute a taking? Second, would the assertion of sovereign immunity
in an infringement-based takings action violate the Just Compensation
Clause?
1. Is Infringement a Taking?
Whether the Takings Clause covers patents is, technically, an unsettled
question. As long ago as 1882, the Supreme Court took it for granted
that patents "cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation, any more than [the government] can appro-
priate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a
private purchaser. ' 318 This broad statement notwithstanding, most of the
Supreme Court's references to patents as being within the protection of
the Takings Clause can fairly be characterized as dicta. 319 Yet, only one
modern court has held patents to be outside the scope of the Takings
Clause. 320 The academic community rejects that reading. 321 Trade
secrets, those evanescent state-based intellectual-property rights, are pro-
tected from unconstitutional takings.322 Dictum in Florida Prepaid
316. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933).
317. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640. Because a constitutional claim is not ripe until a
State denies just compensation, the PRA regulates before there is a violation and thus
technically regulates States that are not necessarily acting unconstitutionally. Regulation
where the claim is not yet ripe should be distinguished from a statute that regulates acts
that are constitutional no matter when adjudicated. For example, the ADEA outlawed
many rational employment decisions that would never become unconstitutional.
318. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357 (1882). See also Crozier v. Fried, Krupp AG,
224 U.S. 290, 305, 307, 308 (1912) (referring to patent suit as action in "eminent domain");
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 11, 19 (1994) (same). But see Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U.S. 163, 168 (1894) (rejecting idea that "every appropriation of private
property by any official to the uses of the government ... creates a claim founded upon the
Constitution of the United States"); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 613 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Schillinger approvingly).
319. Cotter, supra note 273, at 543.
320. DeGraffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 386-89 (1993).
321. Michael Wells, "Available State Remedies" and the Fourteenth Amendment: Com-
ments on Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1665, 1680 (2000);
Volokh, supra note 213, at 1167-68; Cotter, supra note 273, at 566; Heald & Wells, supra
note 271, at 871. See also Peter Bray, After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, Are States
Subject To Suit For Copyright Infringement?: The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and
Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 36 Hous. L. REV. 1531, 1587 (1999) (arguing that copyrights
should be covered by Takings Clause).
322. Ruckeslhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
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strongly implies coverage. 323 Patents are "surely included within the [pri-
vate] property of which no person may be deprived by a State" without
just compensation. 324
Heald and Wells suggest that patent infringement be treated like a pos-
sessory taking. In most intellectual property cases "the complained-of
government action is not the exercise of the police power by the passage
of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, nor the action of a zoning board; it
is typically the appropriation of patented or copyrighted materials by bu-
reaucrats or university professors for the state's own use."'325 As noted
above, a 19th-Century Supreme Court embraced the possessory
model. "326
The usefulness of this analogy is limited by the very nature of intellec-
tual property. A possessory taking of real or personal property directly
interferes with every stick in the proverbial bundle: the rights to possess,
exclude, use, transfer, destroy/alter, or enjoy the fruits and profits of the
property. Intellectual property is problematic because ideas can be pos-
sessed by more than one person. The State can put a patent to public use
without eliminating the patentee's ability to use the patent himself. In
such event, a patentee can still gather fruits of his labor, prevent nongov-
ernmental competitors from infringing, or license or transfer his right to
others.327
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Court found that certain trade secrets
had been 'taken' by a change in a regulatory scheme. 328 To discern
whether a taking occurred, the Court applied the complex of factors
courts consider when not all beneficial use of property is destroyed by
governmental action. These factors include the character of the govern-
mental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 329 Congress explicitly guaranteed that
certain trade secrets could not be divulged, then allowed for their disclo-
sure. Though Congress had an undeniable right to regulate Monsanto's
activities, the promise not to disclose trade secrets created a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality that justified Monsanto's financial invest-
ments. The Monsanto Court did not even discuss the first two factors
because this factor overwhelmed any weight that could be assigned to
them.330
323. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S at 642 (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183,
197 (1857) and Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877)).
324. Id. at 642.
325. Heald & Wells, supra note 271, at 870.
326. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881).
327. Unlike real property, a patent cannot easily be destroyed.
328. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984).
329. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
330. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, __ U.S. __, 2002 U.S.
LEXIS 3028 (Apr. 23, 2002), endorsing the consideration of the Penn Central factors where
not all beneficial use of property is destroyed by regulation, lends support to the applica-
tion of the Penn Central analysis here.
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Applying these factors to patent infringement, the typical infringement
would likely effect a taking if perpetrated by a duly authorized state ac-
tor. At least until Florida Prepaid introduced uncertainty into the patent
regime, it was eminently reasonable for a patentee to invest in an inven-
tion with the expectation of enjoying exclusive rights, even against the
States. No matter the strength of the governmental purpose, the State's
interference with the patentee's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions would be of such overwhelming importance that a taking must be
acknowledged. Patent infringement violates the central aim of takings
law by "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. '331 An
infringing State decreases the value of the patent by co-opting part of the
return, thereby diminishing the incentive to invent and frustrating the
constitutional purpose. Such an act demands just compensation.
2. Sovereign Immunity and Just Compensation
Assuming that patent infringement by the State effects a taking, the
question becomes whether the assertion of sovereign immunity to defeat
a claim violates the Just Compensation Clause. In City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,332 Justice Kennedy remarked that the
Court has not yet decided whether "the sovereign immunity rationale re-
tains its vitality in cases where the [Fifth] Amendment is applicable." In
Supreme Court decisions dealing with patent-infringement claims against
the United States before the Act of June 25, 1910,333 the troubling ques-
tion was whether the federal Court of Claims had jurisdiction to hear
such suits. 334 The immunity of the United States was not seriously ques-
tioned. 335 It seems clear that Congress has long understood that sover-
eign immunity should not bar recovery of just compensation. In Texas,
an inverse condemnation proceeding is considered "a limited exception
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. '336 Regardless the explanation,
allowing States to assert sovereign immunity in the face of a taking would
render the Just Compensation Clause a nullity. Such behavior is likely to
be unconstitutional.
C. THE PRA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
The third step in the City of Boerne congruence analysis involves a
comparison of constitutional and statutory standards of liability to deter-
331. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
332. 526 U.S. 687, 713-14 (1999) (plurality opinion).
333. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1994)).
334. See generally Cotter, supra note 273, at 543-50.
335. But see Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894) (rejecting idea that "every
appropriation of private property by any official to the uses of the government.., creates a
claim founded upon the Constitution of the United States"); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,
613 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Schillinger approvingly).
336. Loyd v. ECO Res., Inc., 956 S.W.2d 110, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, no writ).
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mine whether legislation is congruent with the Fourteenth Amendment
provision to be enforced. Assuming that the assertion of sovereign im-
munity in a takings case would violate the just-compensation guarantee,
Congress can legislate to prevent unconstitutional behavior so long as the
legislation enforces and does not redefine the Just Compensation Clause.
To measure the PRA's congruence, we must ask two questions: (1)
whether the Act's definition of infringement is consistent with the defini-
tion of a taking, and (2) whether the Act's remedies for infringement are
congruent with the meaning of just compensation.
1. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause defines the circumstances that trigger the States'
obligation to pay just compensation. In this respect, it articulates the con-
stitutional standard for liability: a state actor, duly authorized by law,
takes private property for public use. To measure the PRA's congruence,
we must compare its standard for liability against the constitutional
standard.
The general rule against infringement is stated in § 271 of the Patent
Act: "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without author-
ity [of the patentee] makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented in-
vention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the
patent. ' 337 The PRA applies this rule to "[a]ny State, any instrumentality
of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a
State acting in his official capacity. '338 It appears to track the require-
ments of the Takings Clause fairly precisely: It applies to state actors; its
application to officials and employees acting in their official capacity im-
plies that the Act is limited to infringements that are duly authorized by
law; it protects a form of private property.339 The public-use requirement
is missing, but the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the requirement
suggests that its omission is of little consequence. 340 To this extent, the
PRA does nothing more than "parrot" the constitutional guarantee. 341
The PRA's conception of infringement deserves closer attention be-
cause § 271 is not limited to direct infringements. It includes both con-
tributory infringement 342 and indirect infringement under the doctrine of
337. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).
338. Id. § 296(a) (1994).
339. Bohannon and Cotter suggest that "some common uses of intellectual property by
state actors do not implicate the Fifth Amendment due to lack of sufficient legislative
authorization," and conclude that the Takings Clause cannot support the PRA. Bohannon
& Cotter, supra note 212, at 1475. Regardless which test is used to define authorization,
§ 269(a) can fairly be read to reach only those infringements that duly authorized by law.
340. See supra Part V-A-3.
341. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). But see Bohannan & Cotter,
supra note 212, at 1475-77 (arguing that infringements based on vicarious liability are too
tenuous to be considered "authorized").
342. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), (d) (1994).
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equivalents. 343 The prohibition against contributory infringement "pro-
tect[s] patent rights from subversion by those who, without directly in-
fringing the patent themselves, engage in acts designed to facilitate
infringement by others. ' 344 The Supreme Court has recognized that
"[t]his protection is of particular importance in situations .. where the
technicalities of patent law make it relatively easy to profit from an-
other's invention without risking a charge of direct infringement. '345
Contributory infringement "sweeps into the net of infringement the mak-
ing, use or sale of less than the entire patented device. ' 346 It also em-
braces inducement, i.e., behavior that "amounts to an attempt to
appropriate the value of an invention," including instructing others how
to infringe.347 Unlike ordinary infringement, contributory infringement
requires a showing of knowledge or intent.348 Under the doctrine of
equivalents, "a product or process that does not literally infringe upon
the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe
if there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the accused product or
process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. ' 349 The Su-
preme Court has opined that "to permit imitation of a patented invention
which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protec-
tion of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. ''350
Whether contributory or indirect infringements rise to the level of a
compensable taking depends on the relative importance of the govern-
mental action, the economic effect on the patentee, and the infringe-
ment's interference with the reasonable investment-backed expectations
of the patentee. With respect to contributory infringement, a govern-
ment's facilitation of infringement is doubtlessly negative in character
and of dubious social value. The economic effect on the patentee would
vary widely, depending on how fully the patentee (or her licensee) has
developed the market. Finally, inventors willingly incur research and de-
velopment costs and disclose valuable information in hopes of securing
the protections of the patent laws, which include a protection against con-
tributory infringement. This final factor was considered so overwhelming
in Monsanto that the Court did not even discuss the other factors. This
same analysis can be applied to indirect infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents, although the government action could very well benefit
the general welfare.
343. Although a judicial doctrine, the doctrine of equivalents would apply to the States
because such infringement is considered an "infringement of a patent under section 271."
Id. § 296.
344. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980).
345. Id.
346. MERGES, supra note 206, at 293.
347. Id.
348. See Trell v. Marlee Elec. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Water Tech. Corp.
v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668-69 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
349. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
350. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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It is worth noting that certain varieties of patent infringement would
not amount to a taking. For example, use of a patented invention purely
for research purposes would likely not constitute a taking. The govern-
ment action is highly beneficial to society, advancing progress in the sci-
ences. The economic effect on the patentee's use of the invention is
negligible. Given the long-standing character of the experimental-use de-
fense, 351 the patentee has no reasonable investment-backed expectation
with respect to infringements qualifying for the defense. On balance,
such infringements fall within the class of state actions for which no com-
pensation is constitutionally required. Similarly, it is unlikely that a tak-
ing occurs when a state medical practitioner uses a medical method
covered by a patent. Without a doubt, enforcing the exclusive rights of
the patentee in this context would be detrimental to the general welfare.
Although the economic impact on the patentee (in the form of lost licens-
ing fees) is significant, the reasonableness of investment-backed expecta-
tions is questionable. As it happens, Congress has barred compensation
to holders of medical-method patents when those patents are infringed by
medical practitioners. In the context of state infringement of a privately
held patent, this exclusion can be viewed as a valid exception to the gen-
eral rule: no taking, no liability.352
As a rule, patent infringement under § 271-whether direct, indirect or
contributory-will constitute a taking even when not all economically
beneficial or productive value is destroyed. No relief is available for cer-
tain "infringements," such as experimental uses and the use of a patented
medical method by a medical practitioner. These exceptions appear to be
consistent with the notion that certain acts that leave some economically
beneficial or productive uses will not constitute a taking. By requiring
States to abide by § 271, the PRA regulates conduct which is likely to be
classified as a taking.
2. The Just Compensation Clause
To judge the PRA's congruence with the Just Compensation Clause, it
is necessary to compare the remedies available under the PRA with those
permissible in a takings suit.353 Section 269(b) provides that "remedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for the viola-
tion [of § 271] to the same extent as such remedies are available for such
a violation in a suit against any private entity. '354 Thus, under the PRA,
351. See generally Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
352. See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1994). Contra Courtenay C. Brinkerhoff, Medical Method
Patents and the Fifth Amendment: Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. J. 147, 168-76 (1996).
353. Florida Prepaid declined to consider the relevance of remedies in the context of its
due process analysis. See 527 U.S. at 645.
354. Pub. L. 102-560, § 2(a)(2), 106 Stat. 4230 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296(b)).
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States are potentially liable for damages,355 interest,356 costs, 3 5 7 treble
damages,358 attorneys' fees, 359 and the additional remedy for infringe-
ment of design patents.360 Though not specifically authorizing injunctive
relief, the parenthetical reference to equitable remedies would support a
request for such relief.361 In patent-infringement suits, damages may be
awarded in the form of lost profits362 or a reasonable royalty.363 Conse-
quential damages are not recoverable. 364
The modes of calculating damages in patent-infringement suits are di-
rected at finding the market value of loss caused by the infringement. 365
This is consistent with the objectives of the Just Compensation Clause. 366
The PRA provides for the payment of interest, just as is required by the
Constitution.367 Although not required under the Just Compensation
Clause, the PRA authorizes courts to award attorneys' fees and costs, but
only under extraordinary circumstances. 368 Likewise, though the courts
might be authorized to issue injunctions, such relief is within the discre-
tion of the trial judge.369 Preliminary injunctions in particular are subject
to a balancing test that includes consideration of the public interest,370
355. 35 U.S.C. § 284 ("damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty").
356. Id. (Interest shall be "fixed by the court.").
357. Id. (Costs shall be "fixed by the court.").
358. Id. Damages may be increased by as much as three times if there is a finding of
willful or wanton infringement. See Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
and Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
359. Id. § 285 ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party."). See Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 713 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (requiring "unfairness, bad faith, inequitable conduct, vexatious litigation, or
some similar exceptional circumstance" to justify awarding attorneys' fees).
360. Id. § 289.
361. Id. § 283. See also Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1270-73 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (detailing requirements for preliminary injunction); MERGES, supra note 206, at
321-33 ("When a full trial concludes with a finding of infringement, there is almost never
any doubt that a permanent injunction will issue."). But see Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foun-
dry Co., 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding a reasonable royalty damage award but
no injunction).
362. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 n.5 (6th Cir.
1978) (detailing factors to be considered when determining lost profits); Polaroid Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that courts must
consider "all market influences").
363. Id. at 1157-58 (quoting Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire
Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937), in turn quoting Rockwood v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher
Co., 37 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1930)) ("A reasonable royalty is an amount 'which a person,
desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be
willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make and sell the patented article, in the
market, at a reasonable profit."').
364. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
365. See supra notes 362-64.
366. See supra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 316.
368. See supra notes 314-15, 357, & 359.
369. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994) (Courts "may grant injunctions.., on such terms as the
court deems reasonable.").
370. See, e.g., H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
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which is implicated whenever a federal court deigns to issue an injunction
against a State.
The issue of treble damages is more difficult. Generally speaking,
treble damages may be awarded upon a finding of willful patent infringe-
ment.371 The Federal Circuit has adopted a list of factors for courts to
consider when determining whether treble damages should be awarded in
infringement cases:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the idea in the patent;
(2) whether the infringer investigated the scope of the patent and
acted on a good-faith belief that it was not infringing a valid patent;
and (3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation.... Addi-
tional factors the Court might consider are: (4) the defendant's finan-
cial resources; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration of the
defendant's conduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) defen-
dant's motivation; and (9) whether the defendant attempted to con-
ceal its misconduct.372
These factors assume that treble damages under the Patent Act are
intended to be punitive. Dictum in Florida Prepaid concurs with this
view.373 Alternatively, treble damages can be seen as a means of com-
pensating for damages that cannot be adequately measured.374 Inasmuch
as the former view is well entrenched, the PRA would allow the award of
treble (punitive) damages against a State even though such damages are
inconsistent with the idea of just compensation. 375 As with attorneys'
fees, costs, and injunctive relief, the award of treble damages is conferred
to the discretion of the court. A federal judge cognizant of federalism
concerns would be prudent not to award punitive damages against a
State. Such an exercise of discretion, however, is in tension with § 289(b),
which requires courts to assess remedies against the States "to the same
extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against
any private entity. '376
How one interprets this mandate determines whether the PRA en-
forces the Just Compensation Clause or significantly enlarges the obliga-
tions of the States beyond the requirements of the Constitution. If the
latter view prevails, the fact that Congress found no "evidence of massive
or widespread violation of patent laws by the States either with or with-
371. See Kloster Speedsteel AB, Speedsteel of N.J., Inc. v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565,
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
372. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems., 846 F. Supp. 542, 548 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
373. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627, 648 n.l (1999) (using the terms interchangeably).
374. G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Matters: Thoughts about Multi-
ple Damages, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 97 n.51 (1997) (citing Schwarzel v. Holenshade, 121
F. Cas. 722 (No. 12,506) (S.D. Ohio 1866)) ("recovery of treble damages designed to com-
pensate fully where actual damages would be inadequate"). See also Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (1983) (suggesting that treble damages under Act of July 8, 1870, the revised
patent code, were not punitive in nature).
375. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.-312, 326 (1893).
376. 35 U.S.C. § 296(b) (1994).
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out this State immunity, '377 coupled with the lack of tailoring,378 would
tend to suggest that the PRA is effectively substantive with respect to the
Just Compensation Clause. If the former view prevails, then the PRA is
valid enforcement legislation and Congress properly abrogated the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because the PRA requires
courts to treat States no differently than private citizens and there is little
evidence that the States are rampantly violating their obligation to pay
just compensation, it is more likely than not that the PRA redefines the
meaning of just compensation. Insofar as it fails to enforce the Just Com-
pensation Clause, the PRA cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment im-
munity and the courts properly dismissed the case against Florida
Prepaid.
VI. RESPONDING TO FLORIDA PREPAID
A. AVAILABLE STATE REMEDIES
The Florida Prepaid Court repeatedly chastised Congress for failing to
determine what state-law remedies were available to injured patentees
before concluding it was necessary to abrogate state sovereign immunity
to enforce the Due Process Clause.379 As discussed above, there is no
great need for Congress to compile an extensive legislative record of state
abuses when § 5 legislation does not change the meaning of the constitu-
tional right it purports to enforce. However, absent congressional legisla-
tion that conforms with City of Boerne or state waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity by statute, 380 patentees who seek to enforce their
rights against state infringers must rely on state law for redress. A com-
prehensive survey of possible state-law actions for patent infringement by
state actors is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief look at Texas
law provides a glimpse at some of the difficulties injured patentees face.
1. Common-Law Torts
Because Congress preempted the States in the field of patent law at
least 165 years ago, 38 1 any suit to recover against a State for patent in-
fringement must be shoehorned into another cause of action. In Florida
Prepaid, Chief Justice Rehnquist identified several potential causes of ac-
tion that might form a basis for relief, including restitution, deceit, unfair
competition, and conversion. 38 2 In Texas, relevant common-law torts in-
377. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641 (quoting Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hear-
ing on H.R. 3886 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 22 (1990) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier)).
378. Id. at 646-47.
379. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643-44.
380. See, e.g., H.B. 7438, 2001-2002 Leg., Jan. 2002 Sess. (R.I. 2002); S.B. 2190, 2001-
2002 Leg., Jan. 2002 Sess. (R.I. 2002).
381. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 643 n.8.
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clude conversion,383 misappropriation, 384 and fraud.385 Conversion is
probably a poor choice, as Texas courts tend to limit its application to
chattels, as opposed to intellectual property.386 Under Texas law, fraud
requires proof of plaintiff's reliance on a material false representation
made at least recklessly, but this fact pattern ill fits an infringement that
involves no representation on the part of the State.387 Texas' misappro-
priation tort is grounded in theories of unfair competition and derives
from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in INS v. AP.388 To recover
under this theory a plaintiff must show "(i) the creation of plaintiff's
product through extensive time, labor, skill and money, (ii) the defen-
dant's use of that product in competition with plaintiff,... and (iii) com-
mercial damage to the plaintiff.389 This theory seeks to prevent
competitors from taking a "free ride," that is, gaining a special advantage
because they bear little of the development costs incurred by the plain-
tiff.390 An injured patentee might easily frame an infringement claim in
terms of the State's use in competition of a patented invention that was
developed "through extensive time, labor, skill and money. '391
Even if a plaintiff could articulate a claim under any of these causes of
action, the State's sovereign-immunity doctrine would require a prompt
dismissal. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), Texas has waived
its immunity to suits arising from two classes of injuries:
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused
by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee
acting within his scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury or death arises from
the operation of use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven
equipment; and
(B) the employee would be liable to the claimant according to
Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tan-
gible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were
it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas
383. Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, n.w.h.).
384. United States Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d
214, 218 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
385. Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 524 (Tex.
1998).
386. United States Sporting Prods., 865 S.W.2d at 222 ("[C]onversion typically deals
with chattels, and misappropriation deals with intangible property.").
387. Johnson & Higgins, 962 S.W.2d at 524.
388. Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See generally James E. Hud-
son, III, A Survey of the Texas Unfair-Competition Tort of Common-Law Misappropria-
tion, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 921 (1998); Raymond A. Be, Dead or Alive? Misappropriation
Doctrine Resurrected in Texas, 33 Hous. L. REV. 447 (1996).
389. United States Sporting Prods., 865 S.W.2d at 218.
390. Id.
391. Even then, the misappropriation tort would not provide complete coverage-the
"product" requirement might be construed narrowly to embrace only those patents that
have been turned into commercially saleable products, even though a patent can be en-




Patent infringement cannot reasonably be considered a use of tangible
personal or real property infringement rarely if eve cause personal injury
or death, so subsection (2) would not apply. Even if "property damage"
were construed broadly enough to cover the damage caused by infringe-
ment, subsection (1)(B) limits waiver to damage arising from automobile
wrecks. Furthermore, the TTCA does not waive immunity for intentional
torts. 393 Some Texas courts have refused to allow intentional torts
framed as negligence suits to pierce the sovereign veil. 394 Thus, common-
law claims will be ineffective to redress patent infringement by the State
of Texas.
2. Inverse Condemnation
A plaintiff whose patent has been infringed by the State of Texas might
be able to secure relief by asserting a claim grounded on Texas' version of
the Takings Clause. Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution pro-
vides that "[njo person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed
for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made
S. . "1395 A lawsuit based on this provision, called an inverse condemna-
tion, 396 "is a limited exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. '397
To prevail in an inverse condemnation, the plaintiff must show that (i) a
governmental entity intentionally performed certain acts; (ii) those acts
resulted in the taking of the property; and (iii) such taking was for public
use. 398 No liability will attach for damages arising from negligent acts
because "a damaging from unintended and negligent acts results in no
benefit to the public. '399 Nor will the State be held liable unless "some
392. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1997).
393. Delaney v. Univ. of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1992). Conversion, fraud
and misappropriation are intentional torts. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Gen. Projection
Sys. Inc., No. 05-97-00425-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5253, at *39 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Aug. 8, 2000, no pet. h.) (conversion); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 36 (Tex. 1996) (Owens, J.,
dissenting) (fraud); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co. 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (misappropriation).
394. See Holland v. City of Houston, 41 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
395. TEX. CONST. art I, § 17.
396. Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing cause of
action founded upon the takings clause of the Texas Constitution).
397. Loyd v. ECO Resources, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 110, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, no writ).
398. City of Abilene v. Smithwick, 721 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)
399. Loyd, 956 S.W.2d at 128 (citing Tex. Hy. Dept. v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex.
1949)). The relevance of the term "negligence" in the context of patent infringement is
questionable. Many infringements are "unintentional" in the sense that the infringer does
not purposely seek to infringe, although his infringing acts are deliberate. Whereas this
type of infringement might not rise to the level of the "shocking" infringement barred by
the Due Process Clause, see generally supra Part III, it might very well be intended to
benefit the public and thus be intentional enough to satisfy the first element of an inverse
condemnation claim.
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definite right or use in the undertaking" accrues to the public.400
Though this cause of action might not provide relief in the usual case of
unintentional infringement, it is the only exception to sovereign immunity
potentially applicable to an infringed patent. 40 1 Unfortunately, it is far
from clear that an injured patentee can even allege a taking of the type of
"property" protected by the Texas Takings Clause. In Schneider v. North-
east Hospital Authority,40 2 the First District Court of Appeals in Houston
held that "trademark infringement is not a compensable taking" under
the Texas Constitution. Refusing to construe the constitutional provision
broadly (and relying on questionable precedent 40 3), the court declared
that "[i]t is up to the legislature to add the tort of infringement to those
torts for which immunity is statutorily waived."40 4 Schneider was decided
before Florida Prepaid altered the landscape of intellectual-property law,
and another court interested in providing an adequate remedy for patent
infringement might not take so narrow a view of article I, section 17 of
the Texas Constitution. Consequently, the takings route is not necessarily
closed to patentees. 40 5
3. Dynamics and Consequences of Relying on State Remedies
Assuming that the Texas Constitution requires adequate compensation
for the infringement of a patent, it remains unclear whether foisting these
claims on state courts adequately protects a patentee's rights. A petition
alleging such a "taking" would be swiftly met with a denial that any valid
property right exists, followed by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. Put differently, the State would argue that the plaintiff's patent is
invalid and thus represents no compensable property right. The state
judge would be forced to conduct a Markman-type hearing40 6 to deter-
mine the validity of the patent. 40 7 Because modern Texas judges have not
400. Id. ("Except in isolated instances, judicial decisions have narrowed the meaning of
'public use' to those situations in which the damages are incident to the construction and
operation of a public work.").
401. See id. at 125-127 (discussing the other exception, nuisance, which requires proof
of a condition that "substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by causing
unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of reasonable sensibilities attempting to
use and enjoy it").
402. No. 01-96-01098-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7372, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
403. The court cited Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973), for the pro-
position that copyright infringement is not a taking, but failed to consider the impact of
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The court also relied on Garcia v.
Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987), which interpreted the federal Takings Clause not
to cover "shared discovery" of trade secrets with a noncompetitor, but did not address the
Texas Constitution.
404. Schneider, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7372, at *5.
405. Cf. Wilcox Indus., Inc. v. State, 607 N.E.2d 514, 515 (Ohio App. 1992) ("Where a
patent owner seeks to recover just compensation for the government's unauthorized taking
and use of his invention, the theoretical basis for his recovery is the doctrine of eminent
domain.").
406. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
407. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 675 (1969) (declining to pass on issue of patent
invalidity until the state court had considered the question in the first instance).
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been required to apply federal patent law, they face a steep learning
curve, one federal judges often have trouble climbing. Regardless the
outcome of this hearing, appeals will work their way through the system,
forcing the Texas Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas to
interpret federal patent law. Ultimately, the disappointed party will seek
relief not at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the judicial
body most familiar with the intricacies of patent law) but at the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Even if the Nation's highest court denies the petition for certiorari and
the claim is duly tried or dismissed, the question remains whether the
state court's construction of the patent claims is binding on other courts.
If not, the potential for inconsistent interpretations introduces significant
uncertainty into the federal patent regime. This uncertainty is only exac-
erbated by the potential for inconsistent interpretation of patent law.
Perhaps these concerns are speculative and overblown. At the very least,
it is not obvious that the haphazard system that would rise from the ashes
of Florida Prepaid is any better than the exclusively federal system it
replaces.
B. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
The congressional response to Florida Prepaid has been generally mild
with only a few representatives giving it much attention. Senator Patrick
Leahy of Vermont called the decision "deeply disturbing. ' 40 8 Reading
the decision to require a fully developed record before congressional ac-
tion is possible under § 5, Senator Leahy decried the Court's "breathtak-
ing lack of respect for a co-equal branch of Government. '40 9 He
continued, "Congress is not an administrative agency, and it should not
be required to dot every 'i' and cross every 't' before taking action in the
public interest. '410 Senator Arlen Specter suggested that the decision
"leave[s] us with an absurd and untenable state of affairs" wherein the
States "enjoy an enormous advantage over their private sector competi-
tors."' 411 Though surprised by the decisions, the Senator stated he was
''even more surprised by the lack of reaction by Members of the House
and Senate to this usurpation of Congressional authority. '412 Senator
Leahy introduced a strong bill designed to compel States to waive immu-
nity in the fall of 1999.4 13 A House subcommittee held hearings on the
bill in July 2000,414 but the bill never came up for a vote. In response to a
request from Senator Orrin Hatch, the General Accounting Office pub-
408. 145 CONG. REC. S8069 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
409. Id. at S8070.
410. Id.
411. 145 CONG. REC. S10359 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Specter).
412. Id.
413. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong.
(1999) [hereinafter IPPRA '99].
414. House Panel Hears from Experts on State Immunity from IP Suits, 60 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) 257 (July 28, 2000).
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lished in September 2001 a report on state infringement of intellectual
property.415 A milder version of the Leahy bill was introduced in both
the House and the Senate on November 1, 2001.416 The Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary held hearings on the bill in February 2002.417 The
Bush Administration has yet to take a position on the new bill,418 which
remained in committee as this book went to press.
1. Potential Congressional Responses
On July 27, 2000, the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property held a hearing on state sovereign im-
munity and the protection of intellectual-property rights. Among those
testifying at the hearing was Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyright
for the United States.419 Ms. Peters outlined five approaches to the cur-
rent situation in which States "enjoy the benefits of federal intellectual
property protection [but] are not subject to the same burdens that govern
other participants in the federal intellectual property system. ' '420
First, Congress might amend the Judicial Code to allow copyright and
patent suits against States in state courts.421 Ms. Peters quickly dismissed
that option as ineffective under Alden v. Maine,422 which allows States to
assert sovereign immunity in state courts when the cause of action is
based on federal law that does not allow for such suits in federal court.
Ms. Peters also noted the potential for multiple state-court interpreta-
tions of the same federal statutes and the virtual lack of experience in
these matters on the part of state judges.
Second, Congress might condition the disbursement of certain federal
funds on a waiver of state sovereign immunity. 42 3 For example, state col-
415. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Orrin G.
Hatch, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Intellectual
Property: State Immunity in Infringement Actions, GAO No. 01-811 (Sept. 2001) [herein-
after Hatch Report]. The Hatch Report concluded that infringement suits against States
were few, totaling only 58 since January 1, 1985. Nicholas P. Godici, Acting Under Secre-
tary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Acting Director of the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, suggested that the Hatch Report's emphasis on past litigation
failed to provide a complete picture of the problem in part because "[t]oo little time has
elapsed since the 1999 Florida Prepaid decisions for the GAO to gauge whether immunity
from suits for damages has led to states relaxing their standards for the use of intellectual
property." Letter from Nicholas P. Godici to Jim Wells, Sept. 5, 2001, available in Hatch
Report, at 69. Accord Letter of David 0. Carson to Jim Wells, Aug. 28, 2001, available in
Hatch Report, at 72.
416. Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001, S. 1611, 107th Cong.
(2001) [hereinafter IPPRA '01].
417. Panel Considers Bill to Restore Right to Sue States for IP Infringements, 63 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 368 (2002) [hereinafter Panel Considers Bill].
418. Id.
419. Also testifying were: Todd Dickinson, Undersecretary for Intellectual Property at
the Department of Commerce and Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; Pro-
fessor Mark Lemley of the Boalt School of Law at the University of California at Berkeley;
and Professor Daniel Meltzer of Harvard Law School.
420. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
421. Id.
422. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
423. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
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leges and universities might lose federal funding if the State failed to
waive its immunity in federal intellectual-property infringement suits. 424
Though such a scheme might be tailored to reach the likeliest offenders,
Ms. Peters acknowledged that no court cases "explicitly refer to the
spending power as a legitimate means of inducing voluntary State waiver
of sovereign immunity. '425 Furthermore, if a court were to find the
amount of money conditioned on the waiver to be "so great as to become
coercive, it may strike down the condition. '426
Third, Congress might give a federal agency power to bring suits
against States to vindicate the rights of private parties.427 Ms. Peters
identified several shortcomings with this approach. Such an agency is un-
likely to be adequately staffed or funded during times of strict fiscal disci-
pline. 428 The relief would probably be no better than can already be
secured under the Ex parte Young.429 Further, there is some doubt as to
the constitutionality of a scheme that allows the federal government to
sue a State to recover for injuries of individual citizens.430 Finally, the
creation of such an agency runs counter to the current trend against ex-
pansion of the federal government. 431
Fourth, Congress might exercise its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact "appropriately-tailored legislation" to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in federal intellectual property lawsuits. 432 Ms.
Peters suggested that "Congress must establish a strong record of in-
fringement by States" before attempting to exercise its § 5 power.43 3 Ac-
cording to Ms. Peters, "the abrogation must be drafted so that it applies
only to States that do not provide a remedy" for infringement.434 The
abrogation contemplated by Ms. Peters would also cover only non-negli-
gent infringements. Ms. Peters also opined that an abrogation requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate a deprivation without due process "might be im-
practical for individual litigants and thus ineffective. '435
424. See generally Jennifer Poise, Holding the Sovereign's Universities Accountable for
Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, 89 CAL. L. REV. 507,
530-35 (2001). In her congressional testimony, Ms. Peters expressed a disinclination to
support legislative action that would penalize public colleges and universities because state
legislatures refused to waive immunity. See Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
425. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
426. Id. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
427. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
428. Id.
429. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
430. Peters Testimony, supra note 9 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251
(1972)).
431. Id.
432. Id. See also State Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellectual Property:
Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellec-
tual Property, 106th Cong. (2000) (summary testimony of Mark A. Lemley) [hereinafter
Lemley Testimony], 2000 WL 23831769 (suggesting abrogation of state sovereign immunity
under the Takings or Due Process Clauses).
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Finally, Ms. Peters proposed that Congress "condition States' exercise
of federal intellectual property rights ... on a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity for infringement suits. '4 36 Because the Supreme Court has discarded
the theory of implied waiver of sovereign immunity,437 this waiver must
be express and voluntary. Such an approach must "induce States affirma-
tively to waive their immunity, most likely by state statute. ' 438 The idea
of conditioning state participation in the federal intellectual-property sys-
tem on express waiver of sovereign immunity was praised by everyone
testifying before the House subcommittee. 439 Ms. Peters downplayed
suggestions that making the States expressly waive immunity in order to
continue participating in the patent, copyright and trademark systems is
overly coercive.440
In addition to the proposals discussed by Ms. Peters at the House hear-
ings, Professor Daniel Meltzer has identified three other potential solu-
tions. For one, he suggested that Congress could create a cause of action
allowing injured patentees to recover damages from state officials.441
This option would require only minor modification of the IP laws, includ-
ing specific withdrawal of any qualified immunity ordinarily conferred on
state officials. But such a suit would put plaintiffs in an undesirable
position:
[P]laintiffs may have difficulty identifying and suing all the responsible
individuals; it may be burdensome to adjudicate multiple claims against
multiple individuals and prove their individual responsibility for the acts
in question; juries may hesitate to award adequate damages against indi-
vidual officers serving the public under often difficult conditions; and col-
lecting on multiple judgments may be burdensome or, as a practical
matter, impossible, for individual officials may have few if any resources
from which a judgment could effectively be collected. 442
On the other hand, it is possible that States would indemnify officials in
such circumstances as well as provide counsel for those who are sued.443
This indemnification would result in a State-liability regime similar to the
one struck down in Florida Prepaid. Though Professor Meltzer believes
436. Id.
437. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999).
438. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
439. U.S. Representative Howard Coble (R-NC) Holds Hearing on State Sovereign Im-
munity and Protection of Intellectual Property, House Committee on the Judiciary Sub-
committee on Courts and Intellectual Property, (FDCH Political Transcripts July 27, 2000)
(statement of Todd Dickson) (the PTO is "likely to recommend that Congress look very
carefully at the possibility of eliciting waivers of sovereign immunity in exchange for the
state's ability to participate in the federal intellectual property system); id. (statement of
Mark Lemley) (endorsing conditions that are "as related as possible to the thing that you
want the states to give up"); id. (statement of Daniel Meltzer) ("conditioning the grant of
new intellectual property rights on a state's agreement to waive immunity seems to me
promising").
440. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
441. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity, supra note 99, at 1357-61.
442. Id. at 1359.
443. Id.
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that this state of affairs "hardly constitutes a blow for harmonious feder-
alism,' 444 the proposal's impracticality argues against its adoption.
Professor Meltzer identified a variation on this approach, which, he
suggests, might obviate some of the difficulties outlined above. After a
private litigant sues a state official for damages or an injunction or both,
"[niothing would ... stop the United States from bringing a follow-up
action ... against the state, seeking a civil fine to be paid from the state
treasury for the state's violation of federal law."' 445 Though the fines
would be paid into the U.S. Treasury, Congress could authorize payment
of a portion of those fines to the injured patentee. To forestall the neces-
sity of follow-up litigation, Congress could create incentives for the States
to make sure full payment of the initial judgment is paid.446
Congress might also consider creating a qui tam action whereby the
private patentee can bring suit against an offending State on behalf of the
United States.447 This theory relies on the fact that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not prohibit the United States from suing a State. Professor
Meltzer doubts this theory will hold water. The Supreme Court recently
held that a relator bringing suit under a qui tam action is a private party
suing as the assignee of the federal government's claim.448 If the Elev-
enth Amendment bars suits by private parties suing on their own claim,
why, asks Meltzer, should a private party suing as an assignee fare any
differently? Dismissing this approach, Meltzer agrees with Professor
Caminker's assessment: "'[Q]ui tam authorization feels like something of
a bootstrap; one might suspiciously view it as an effort to circumvent the
Seminole Tribe/Alden rule that Congress cannot authorize private parties
to assert their 'own' interests against the states.' '4 4 9
Of these proposals, Professor Meltzer favors a scheme conditioning the
release of federal funds on a State's waiver of immunity from suit.450 Al-
ternatively, Professor Meltzer endorses the proposal that would condition
the grant of additional IP rights on a State's waiver of immunity.451 In
her House testimony, Marybeth Peters stated that effective abrogation of
immunity was the preferable solution. However, to avoid "navigating the
minefield of conditions laid down by the [Supreme] Court," Congress
should "prospectively strip a State's intellectual property of protection
unless that State waived its sovereign immunity for intellectual property
suits in federal court. '4 52
444. Id. at 1361.
445. Id. at 1370.
446. Id. at 1370-72.
447. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity, supra note 99, at 1365-66.
448. Id. at 1367 (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste-
vens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000)).
449. Id. at 1368-69 (quoting Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the
United States, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 92, 134 (1999)).
450. Id. at 1389.
451. Id.
452. Peters Testimony, supra note 9.
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2. Senate Bill 1835: The Intellectual Property Protection Restoration
Act of 1999
On October 29, 1999, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont introduced
Senate bill 1835, the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of
1999 (S. 1835).453 This bill proposes, inter alia, to "provide States an op-
portunity to participate in the Federal intellectual property system on
equal terms with private entities. '454 Senator Leahy proposes to accom-
plish this purpose through an "opt-in" procedure, whereby a State will
assure to the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks that the State will
"waive sovereign immunity from suit in Federal court in any action
against a State" as a condition to receiving the protection of federal intel-
lectual-property laws.455 Should a State assert its sovereign immunity de-
spite this assurance, "any application by or on behalf of a State ...
[would] be regarded as abandoned and .. . not be subject to revival.
.. 456 In addition, the State would be barred from recovering damages
or other monetary relief in any action to enforce intellectual property
rights owned by the State at any time in the five-year period preceding
the wrongful assertion of immunity.457 Furthermore, the State would not
be allowed to opt back into the federal intellectual-property system for
one year. 458 Federal intellectual-property law is defined in S. 1835 to in-
clude laws relating to "patent, protected plant variety, copyright, mask
work, original design, trademark, or service mark" rights.459 Conse-
quently, the wrongful assertion of sovereign immunity in a copyright suit
would affect the State's eligibility to prosecute a patent application or
recover monetary relief in a trademark infringement suit.
Senate Bill 1835 also defines the liability of States for violations of the
intellectual property laws. If a State waives its immunity, it will be held
liable to the same extent as a private party.460 Prospective relief is availa-
ble against officers or employees of a State for infringement, including
injunctions, attorneys fees, and declaratory relief.461 The bill also pro-
vides that a State (including any instrumentality, officer or employee of a
State acting in an official capacity) which fails to waive immunity may be
held liable for "tak[ing] any of the rights of exclusion secured under [the
patent laws] in violation of the fifth amendment of the United States
453. 145 CONG. REc. S13555 (daily ed. October 29, 1999). See generally Lehy Defends
Bill that Would Restore Right to Sue States for Infringement, 59 Pat. Trademark & Copy-
right J. (BNA) 5 (Nov. 4, 1999) (discussing IPPRA '99); Gilbert L. Carey, The Resurgence
of States' Rights Creates New Risk to Intellectual Property, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 123,
145-51 (2000) (same).
454. IPPRA '99, S. 1835, 106th Cong. § 2(b)(1)-(4) (1999).
455. Id. § 111 (b). See also id. § 131(a) (identifying the Commissioner as the person to
whom such assurances shall be delivered).
456. Id. § 113(a).
457. Id. § 113(b).
458. Id. § 113(c).
459. Id. § 101(1).
460. A State that has waived immunity would be subject to 35 U.S.C. § 271 by virtue of
§ 271(h).
461. See, e.g., IPPRA '99 § 201 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 296).
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Constitution, or depriv[ing] any person of any of the [same] without due
process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. '462 Compensa-
tion for such "constitutional violations" would include "damages, inter-
est, and costs under section 284, attorneys fees under section 285, and the
additional remedy for infringement of design patents under section
289."' 463 Injunctions against future constitutional violations would also be
allowed. 464
3. Weaknesses of S. 1835
Senate Bill 1835's principal attraction is its appeal to fairness: "Equity
and common sense tell us that one who chooses to enjoy the benefits of a
law-whether it be a federal grant or the multimillion-dollar benefits of
intellectual property protections-should also bear its burdens. ' 465 This
opinion is plainly founded on the assumption that the State should be
treated similarly as the private citizen, an analogy Professor Volokh has
called into question. 466 The bill appears to deny the States' power of emi-
nent domain with respect to intellectual property.
The bill also betrays hostility to the doctrine of state sovereign immu-
nity. The State that breaches its agreement not to assert its sovereign
immunity faces draconian consequences. The offending State not only
abandons all pending applications and loses the right to opt back into the
federal intellectual-property system for a year, but also surrenders-ap-
parently indefinitely-the right to secure monetary relief from infringe-
ment of any intellectual property owned by the State in the five years
preceding the wrongful assertion.467 Furthermore, the bill defines federal
IP law to cover all varieties of intellectual property.468 Thus, the asser-
tion of sovereign immunity in a patent suit (in spite of an express assur-
ance to the contrary) would cause the State to lose its right to recover
damages (including treble damages), attorneys fees, or costs in infringe-
ment suits relating to any of the copyrights or trademarks owned before
the wrongful assertion.
Additionally, S. 1835 might be open to challenge under South Dakota
v. Dole.469 The Supreme Court has held that Congress may condition the
disbursement of federal funds on the recipient State's agreement to do
some action Congress could not otherwise compel the State to do. How-
ever, this inducement reaches its constitutional limit where "the financial
inducement offered by Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' 470 In College Savings Bank, Jus-
462. Id. (proposed § 296 (b)(2)(A) & (3)(A)(i)).
463. Id. (proposed § 296 (b)(2)(B)).
464. Id. (proposed § 296 (b)(2)(A)(ii)).
465. 145 CONG. REC. S13555, S13557 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
466. See text accompanying notes 213-14, supra.
467. IPPRA '99 § 113(b).
468. Id. § 101(1).
469. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
470. Id. at 211.
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tice Scalia stated, in dicta, that "where the constitutionally guaranteed
protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of co-
ercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of the waiver de-
stroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of
the State from otherwise lawful activity. '471 Though Justice Scalia was
explaining why constructive waiver of sovereign immunity failed constitu-
tional scrutiny, it seems plain that a condition is coercive if a State is
required to waive its sovereign immunity to acquire "otherwise lawful"
federal intellectual-property rights.472 Granted, States that refuse to opt
into the federal IP system would be able to protect currently owned intel-
lectual property. Eventually, however, these rights will expire and the
State will be excluded from the intellectual-property system altogether.
This condition is coercive and probably unconstitutional. Reliance on S.
1835 to restore rights lost under Florida Prepaid will once again leave
Congress with an incomplete patent regime.
The so-called constitutional remedy appears to be valid. Proposed
§ 296(b)(2) provides a remedy for violations of the Takings Clause or the
Due Process Clause. The prohibition claims to reach as far as the Consti-
tution's limits, but does nothing more than parrot the constitutional guar-
antees. Successful plaintiffs may recover damages and interest; in the
discretion of the court, they can receive costs, attorneys fees, profits, and
injunctive relief. No treble damages are authorized by the bill. As with
the PRA, the question of congruence turns on a court's willingness to
construe its ability to award extraconstitutional remedies as constrained
by federalism. With respect to a due-process claim, the proposed reme-
dies appear less onerous than the remedies available under § 1983.
From a purely pragmatic perspective, such enforcement legislation
minimizes the risk of redefinition. So long as Congress avoids deviating
from the constitutional text, it is unlikely to exceed its authority. But
such an approach is lazy, bordering on an abdication of power to the
courts. Congress possesses power to regulate the constitutional to pre-
vent or remedy the unconstitutional. If Congress fails to use that power,
unelected judges will fill in the gaps by determining what types of in-
fringement constitute takings and what process is due when a State in-
fringes a patent. City of Boerne says nothing about Congress' power to
apply constitutional standards. In performing its constitutional role, Con-
gress should not hesitate to "identify conduct transgressing the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and ... tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct. '473 It should not hesi-
471. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687
(1999). See also Carey, supra note 412, at 152.
472. See also Draft Bill Would Restore Right to Sue States for Infringement, 58 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 806, 807 (Oct. 21, 1999) (commenting that "viability of
this legislation will turn on whether the consequence for states that decline to waive their
immunity ... is considered a sanction or the denial of a gift").
473. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639.
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tate to enact thoughtfully crafted enforcement legislation reflecting a
clear understanding of due process and just compensation.
4. Senate Bill 1611
Senate bill 1835 is now a dead letter. In November 2001 Senator Leahy
introduced a new, less confrontational version of the condition-and-
waiver approach. 474 Rather than condition all IP rights on a waiver of
immunity, the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001
denies a State the right to recover damages in suits enforcing its own IP
rights unless the State has waived its immunity from infringement suits in
federal court.475 In addition, S. 1611 codifies the Ex parte Young doc-
trine, which holds that federal courts may, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, enjoin state employees from violating federal IP laws. 476
Like S. 1835, the new bill creates a cause of action for those who believe
their constitutional rights have been violated by a State's infringement. 477
The narrower condition has been praised for its "elegan[t]" symme-
try.478 Marybeth Peters, testifying before a Senate committee in Febru-
ary 2002, endorsed the bill and expressed optimism that the incentive it
creates "will be successful in encouraging States to level the playing field
by waiving their immunity. ''479 Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of
the American Intellectual Property Law Association, emphasized the
fairness of S. 1611 in comparison with S. 1835. Whereas the earlier bill
would have "totally precluded [States] from acquiring a Federal intellec-
tual property right unless it waived its sovereign immunity to suits arising
under those laws," the new bill "giv[es] States the right to obtain patents,
copyrights, and trademarks and to obtain injunctive relief in federal
courts even if they never waive their sovereign immunity. '480 Mr. Kirk
474. See Joint Bills Are Introduced to Restore Right to Sue States for IP Infringement, 63
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 24 (Nov. 9, 2001). The new bills appear to adopt
many of the revisions to S. 1835 seen in drafts circulated in early 2000. See Draft Revisions
of State Immunity Bill Reveal Continued Interest in Reform, 59 Pat. Trademark & Copy-
right J. (BNA) 545 (Feb. 11, 2000). The drafts shrank the scope of S. 1835's prohibition on
damages to the IP rights at issue in a particular suit. Id. The drafts dropped the abandon-
ment penalty and the one-year bar to state participation in the IP system. Id. The drafts
also added the Ex parte Young remedy. Id. at 546. A draft circulated by the Copyright
Office would withdraw federal-court jurisdiction over IP suits brought by States that had
not waived immunity. Id. This approach has not been adopted by IPPRA '01.
475. IPPRA '01 § 3. See also H.R. 3204 (House version of the bill).
476. Id. § 4. Note, however, that Ex parte Young allows prospective injunctions against
state employees, while IPPRA '01 allows monetary damages, declaratory and injunctive
relief, costs, attorneys fees, and destruction of infringing articles, as provided by federal
law.
477. Id. § 5.
478. See Intellectual Property Protection, Hearings before Senate Judiciary Comm., Feb.
27, 2002 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association) [hereinafter Kirk Statement]. See also Intellectual Property Pro-
tection, Hearings before Senate Judiciary Comm., Feb. 27, 2002 (statement of Hon.
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (describing the new bill's symmetrical approach)
[hereinafter Peters Statement].
479. Peters Statement, supra note 478.
480. Kirk Statement, supra note 478.
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expects that the "proportional incentive" in S. 1611 will be sufficient to
induce States to waive their immunity.481
Not everyone at the February hearings was ready to endorse S. 1611 as
is. James Rogan, named director of the Patent and Trademark Office in
January 2002, supported "a legislative answer to the questions raised by
the Florida Prepaid cases" but indicated that the Bush Administration is
"not prepared to endorse any particular bill at this time. '482 Professor
Paul Bender of the Arizona State University College of Law would go
farther and preclude States from securing injunctive relief unless they
waive immunity.483 And William E. Thro, general counsel for Christo-
pher Newport University and special assistant attorney general for the
Commonwealth of Virginia, denounced the bill as "flawed," unnecessary,
and "contrary to the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence of 'dual
sovereignty.'1, 484
The condition imposed by S. 1611 is most likely constitutional under
Dole and the College Savings Bank dictum. Nonwaiving States can still
obtain, use, and defend patents, copyrights and trademarks; they simply
cannot use federal law to recover monetary damages for infringement of
those IP rights. From a policy perspective, however, it is unlikely to be as
effective an incentive to induce waiver. Some States are absolutely pro-
hibited from waiving immunity (by their state constitution or other legis-
lation).485 States that can waive immunity are unlikely to do so as long as
they can still protect their property by injunction. 486
In addition, the very existence of the so-called constitutional remedy
might actually discourage States from waiving immunity. Under S. 1611,
a nonwaiving State can be sued for acts amounting to violations of the
Takings and Due Process Clauses.487 With respect to direct infringement,
a statutory takings or due-process claim will differ only slightly from an
ordinary infringement claim. But the remedies are substantially different.
Waiving States expose themselves to treble damages.488 Nonwaiving
States do not.489 Furthermore, waiving States can be held liable for in-
fringements that would not necessarily be considered unconstitutional.
From a substantive due process point of view, waiving States can be held
481. Id.
482. Panel Considers Bill, supra note 417, at 368.
483. See Intellectual Property Protection, Hearings before Senate Judiciary Comm., Feb.
27, 2002 (statement of Professor Paul Bender, Arizona State University College of Law)
[hereinafter Bender Statement].
484. Panel Considers Bill, supra note 417, at 369.
485. See Hatch Report, supra note 415, at 15 (noting that at least twenty-two States
cannot waive immunity).
486. See Bender Statement, supra note 483 ("[W]e respectfully question whether permit-
ting States to retain their sovereign immunity while still allowing them to obtain injunctive
relief ... would provide many States with a sufficient reason to waive their immunity.").
487. IPPRA '01 § 5.
488. Nothing in the bill limits the remedies against States that waive immunity. Thus,
the full force of 35 U.S.C. § 284 could be brought to bear upon an infringing State.
489. IPPRA '01 § 5(c)(2) (specifically excluding treble damages).
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liable for unintentional (and thus likely constitutional) infringements for
which a nonwaiving State would be held unaccountable.
Though the constitutional remedies purport to reach only acts that vio-
late the Constitution, it is not altogether certain that this portion of the
new Leahy bill even enforces the Fourteenth Amendment. The soft spot
in the bill is the section that makes the showing necessary to recover
under the constitutional remedy consistent with the proof necessary
under the IP laws. Section 5(d)(1) declares that "the burden of proof"
under the constitutional cause of action "shall be the same as if the action
were brought under" the relevant IP statute. Considering the differences
between the constitutional and statutory standards of liability discussed in
this paper, the new bill's attempt to make constitutional acts unconstitu-
tional would plainly violate City of Boerne. Further, the bill's imposition
of remedies not available under the Just Compensation Clause might also
amount to a substantive change of constitutional law by legislative fiat.490
C. RESTORING FEDERAL PATENT RIGHTS
An examination of three possible justifications for the PRA yields un-
certain guidance for those who would amend the Patent Act to compen-
sate patentees for infringements by state actors. The guarantee of
substantive due process prohibits egregious abuses of power that shock
the conscience. Little, if any, state infringement of patents is shocking in
the constitutional sense. Subjecting the States to all varieties of patent
claims in an attempt to prevent or remedy outrageous state conduct tends
to erode the meaning of the substantive due process guarantee. Only a
record of widespread and persisting unconstitutional deprivations would
justify such strong measures. There is no basis for re-enacting state liabil-
ity under this theory.
Abrogating state sovereign immunity in patent-infringement suits as a
means of enforcing the guarantee of procedural due process rests on a
firmer basis. The constitutionality of a set of procedures is determined by
applying the Mathews balancing test, and a reasonable decision maker
could find that the use of the sovereign-immunity defense to avoid liabil-
ity in infringement suits is likely to be unconstitutional. The key question
is, who gets to decide? The States, Congress, or the Supreme Court?
Considering that Congress could bypass Seminole Tribe by finding viola-
tions of procedural due process under Mathews, the Supreme Court
might not countenance a power in Congress to draw constitutional con-
490. See id. § 5(c)(1). An additional weakness of the bill, as with its predecessor and
Florida Prepaid itself is failure to distinguish between procedural and substantive due
process. As discussed in part IV, supra, the procedural due-process rationale provides an
adequate basis for abrogating sovereign immunity all by itself. Also, § 5(d(2) places the
burden of proving an adequate state remedy on the State or state instrumentality accused
of infringement. Insofar as the bill seems oblivious to the procedural due process ratio-
nale, it is unlikely that this provision is meant to allow the State a chance to defend against
an alleged procedural violation. Instead, it hovers in the background, certain only as to
how it will apply, oblivious as to when.
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clusions based on Supreme Court precedent. 491 Drafting legislation
based on concerns for procedural due process would merely invite a
showdown.
Viewed through the lens of the Just Compensation Clause, the PRA
might have altered the meaning of "just compensation." However, it is
possible for lawmakers to draft legislation that would be congruent with
this constitutional obligation. Congress could shape the remedial aspects
of the law to match the Supreme Court's construction of the Just Com-
pensation Clause. Should Congress choose to give abrogation another
try, it might survive judicial scrutiny by doing the following:
1. Invoking the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of just com-
pensation for state takings of private property for public use;
2. Clearly defining the level or degree of state authorization re-
quired for a cognizable taking;
3. Excluding costs, attorneys' fees, treble damages and injunctive
relief;
4. Expressly authorizing a compulsory licensing scheme in lieu of
damages;
5. Considering whether additional exceptions to the rule against in-
fringement are necessary to align patent law with the idea of a
taking;492
6. Investigating the legal redress available to injured patentees in
each State; and
7. Compiling a record of difficulties faced by patentees seeking to
assert their patent rights against state infringers since Florida
Prepaid.
The first five suggestions align federal law with the constitutional stan-
dard. By excluding liabilities and remedies that are not recognized by the
Court's takings and just compensation jurisprudence, Congress will show
it understands its purpose is to prevent or remedy constitutional viola-
tions, not to redefine the meaning of "taking" or "just compensation." In
particular, a compulsory licensing scheme would effectively allow the
states to take a patent while paying just compensation. Missing from this
list is a requirement that injured patentees pursue state remedies before
seeking federal relief. Channeling these suits through state courts poses
logistical difficulties and raises significant federalism issues.493 Congress'
§ 5 power is broad enough to provide a forum for hearing what amounts
to an inverse-condemnation suit to prevent unconstitutional takings, so
long as the standards by which liability is judged are consistent with the
obligations imposed by the Constitution.
491. However, a refusal to acknowledge congressional power to draw such conclusions
threatens our constitutional structure in ways more dangerous than any encroachment on
state sovereign immunity.
492. Alternatively, Congress could create a state defense to infringement whereby the
State could demonstrate that the infringement cannot reasonably be construed as a taking
in light of the complex of factors considered when not all value is destroyed.
493. See, infra, part VI-A.
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Furthermore, the study of state remedial systems and the record of pat-
entee efforts to secure just compensation will demonstrate the risk of un-
compensated takings. This information will help demonstrate the
proportionality of any deviations from the constitutional norm. City of
Boerne indicates that the showing required to demonstrate proportional-
ity should not be great-so long as the legislation can fairly be under-
stood to enforce rather than redefine the substantive protection against
unconstitutional takings, the purpose of the proportionality inquiry is not
implicated.
VII. CONCLUSION
City of Boerne's congruence and proportionality analysis was adopted
to distinguish between legislation that enforces constitutional guarantees
and legislation that attempts to define the substance of those guarantees.
Although City of Boerne does not deal with appropriateness per se, the
congruence and proportionality analysis might best be understood as an
explication of the limiting phrase in the McCulloch test: "all means which
...consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional. '494 When enforcement legislation is congruent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of constitutional protections, it consists with the
letter of the Constitution. Indicia of proportionality confirm that legisla-
tion consists with the spirit of the Constitution. The deferential posture
of McCulloch should remind courts that
the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
the body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner
most beneficial to the people. 495
When courts lose touch with the spirit of McCulloch and convert City
of Boerne's proportionality inquiry into a license to overturn valid en-
forcement legislation, the result is an overreaching akin to the usurpation
of judicial prerogative rebuffed by City of Boerne. To prevent judicial
overreaching, the question of proportionality should be considered secon-
dary to the question of congruence, verifying the substantive quality of
improper legislation rather than labeling enforcement legislation inappro-
priate. Congruence and proportionality analysis is a smoke detector, not
a means of smoking out unconstitutional legislation.496
It is instructive to note that the limitations City of Boerne cites as indi-
cia of proportionality were described by an earlier sitting of the Court as
inventive solutions to an intractable problem.4 97 When Congress legis-
lates creatively, courts should not interfere unless the legislation holds the
494. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
495. Id.
496. Contra Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 99, at 478 (advocating aggressive ap-
plication of proportionality analysis).
497. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966).
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States to an unjustifiably higher standard than is imposed by the Consti-
tution. If our representatives do not have the power to define the sub-
stance of the Constitution they swear to protect and defend, then, at the
very least, courts should show due deference to a coordinate branch of
government when careful reflection suggests that Congress has acqui-
esced to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution.
When Congress enacted the PRA in 1990, it did so to conform to a
Supreme Court decision that required it to expressly declare it is abrogat-
ing Eleventh Amendment immunity. In drafting the PRA, Congress re-
lied on a recent Supreme Court decision acknowledging Congress' power
to abrogate this immunity under article I of the Constitution. The Court
has since repudiated that decision, leaving Congress to rely (retrospec-
tively) on its enforcement power, which many in 1990 interpreted to be
virtually unrestricted. In 1996, however, the Court announced a new test
for the constitutionality of purported enforcement legislation. The Court
applied a strained interpretation of this test in Florida Prepaid and found
the PRA to be unconstitutional. The Court's shifting jurisprudence not-
withstanding, it appears that Congress failed to give much consideration
to what it was enforcing when it enacted the PRA. By evincing an under-
standing of the constitutional guarantee to be enforced, Congress should
be able to draft a new Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act
that can withstand the scrutiny of a demanding Supreme Court. Until the
next change in the rules, that is.
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